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INTRODUCTION

For well over a century, it has been a settled feature of American and
English tort law that in a variety of situations there is no recovery in negligence
for pure economic loss, that is, for economic loss unrelated to injury to the
person or the property of the plaintiff.' This is true even if the loss is reasonably
avoidable and perfectly foreseeable according to ordinary tort standards. I want
to investigate whether this legal position is sound and how it might be accounted
for.
For purposes of this Article, I shall focus on the kind of nonactionable pure
economic loss that, from the start, has been a relatively fixed point in thinking

* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. A.B. 1974, Harvard University; M.Sc.
(Politics) 1976, The London School of Economics; LL.B. 1982, University of Toronto; LL.M. 1983,
Harvard Law School. This is a substantially revised version of a paper that was first presented at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School Legal Theory Workshop. I would like to thank Bruce
Chapman, Mark Gergen, James Gordley, Adam Kramer, Stephen Perry, Arthur Ripstein, Tony
Sebok, Henry Smith, Jane Stapleton, Robert Stevens, and Ben Zipursky for their helpful comments
and suggestions. I am grateful to Mike Hunziker, Faye Kravetz, and Fredrick Schumann for
excellent research assistance and to the Editors of the South CarolinaLaw Review for their editorial
assistance.
t This Article was peer-reviewed, prior to selection and publication, as part of the South
Carolina Law Review's Peer Review Pilot Program. For more information on the peer review
program, see John P. Zimmer and Jason P. Luther, Peer Review As an Aid to Article Selection in
Student-Edited Legal Journals,60 S.C. L. REV. 959 (2009).
1. This is the generally accepted definition of pure economic loss. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 8, at 3 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006).
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about this issue in all its shapes and forms. I am referring to what is now often
called "relational economic loss. 2 Here, a defendant carelessly damages or
otherwise interferes with something or some facility-for example, a bridgewhich the plaintiff is using but which the plaintiff neither owns nor possesses.
The plaintiff may be entitled to use the bridge under a contract with the thirdparty owner or may simply be free to use it as a member of the public. The
defendant's carelessness interrupts the plaintiffs use of the bridge, making it
necessary for the plaintiff to find alternative facilities at a greater cost. The
increased cost constitutes plaintiffs "relational" financial loss because it results
from damage done to something which the plaintiff neither owns nor possesses.
For more than a century, courts have held such a loss nonactionable.
Given that the law is longstanding and there exists extensive scholarly
literature dealing with this issue, 3 the natural question is why undertake another
inquiry into its rationale. The simple reason is that despite the law being
relatively settled, we lack at present an explanation that makes sense of it, both
in its own domain and in relation to other parts of negligence. The source of the
difficulty is the way most commentators and courts currently understand the
basis of the no recovery rule.
To elaborate, both defenders and critics of the traditional bar against
recovery share the assumption that it cannot be justified on the basis of ordinary
principles of negligence. They take as given that these principles would allow
recovery in the very circumstances where courts have consistently denied it. The
rationale must lie elsewhere. 4 Thus pure economic loss claims are to be governed

2.
See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. The term "relational economic loss" is
widely used in English and British Commonwealth discussions of the issue. See R. BERNSTEIN,
ECONOMIC LOSs 131 (1993); B. FELDTHUSEN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE: THE RECOVERY OF PURE
ECONOMIC LosS 196-272 (2d ed. 1989); STEPHEN M. WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:
CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING 47 (2003). In the United

States, the term most often used for such claims is "negligent interference with contractual
relations." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1977). This latter characterization is
useful to the extent that it points to the important contrast with the tort of intentional interference
with contract. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129,

at 161-68 (5th ed. 1984). However, this characterization is also misleading inasmuch as recovery is
denied whether or not there exists an actual or even a prospective contractual relation between the
plaintiff and the one whose property is damaged. Interestingly, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: ECONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONG adopts the term "relational economic loss."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 19, at 228 (Council

Draft No. 1, 2006).
3.
See sources cited infra note 19.
4.
See Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by
Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 44 (1972) ("[T]he loss to
plaintiff.., would be readily recoverable if the test of duty-or remoteness-usually associated
with the law of negligence were applied."). In addition to James's influential assertion of this view,
the standard torts textbooks are illustrative. See JOHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 179-81 (8th
ed. 1992); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 129; CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR.,

MORRIS ON TORTS 181-83 (2d ed. 1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C cmt.
a (1977) (noting that courts have not generally recognized any liability for a negligent interference
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by a special rule-the "economic loss rule." 5 On this view, economic loss

represents a distinct topic within tort law that apparently raises its own special
policy considerations and concerns.
This view of economic loss is not accidental but rather reflects, in turn, an
underlying general conception of negligence in light of which nonrecovery is
assessed. According to this general conception, the core positive norm in
negligence is the standard of care, with the "duty" question serving the merely
ancillary and negative function of restricting the ambit of legally relevant
conduct to that which imposes foreseeable risks of harm to others. 6 The
touchstone of duty is foreseeability so that one whose conduct creates
foreseeable risk of loss is prima facie subject to a duty to use reasonable care. It
follows that the long-standing denial of claims for pure economic loss even
where perfectly foreseeable must be an exception to and a limit on general
principles, and the task is to explain the policy basis, if any, for treating such loss
differently than the standard case of physical loss to person or property. Thus

arises the problem of pure economic loss.
This conclusion is troubling. How can it be that general principles of

negligence do not determine the appropriate outcome with respect to liability for
financial loss which-no less than property loss-is a form of loss that is legally
deserving of recognition in tort law and indeed is recoverable in other areas of
negligence and of private law? 7 This Article takes this question to heart and
explores whether ordinary principles of negligence might in fact have the

with contracts and prospective contractual relations). Most recently, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: EcONOMic TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS begins its discussion of the economic loss rule
by noting "[t]here are several reasons why courts have not extended general principles of
negligence.., to redress solely pecuniary harm." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: EcON. TORTS
AND RELATED WRONGS Pt. II, Introductory Note, at 1 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006) (emphasis
added). The Reporter's Note to section 8(a), "History of the Rule," characterizes the economic loss
rule "as a limitation on the negligence, strict liability, and products actions, which together compose
modern accident law." Id. § 8(a), Reporter's Note, at 30.
5.
For a brief historical overview of the rule, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: EcON.
TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 8 cmt. a, at 4 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006). The denial of recovery
for pure economic loss arising from defective products is also called the economic loss rule. In this
Article, I limit discussion to relational economic loss. I discuss the defective product cases in Peter
Benson, The Basis for Excluding Liability for Economic Loss in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 427, 436-37 (David Owen ed., 1995).
6.
See infra Part 1V.B. For instructive discussions of this model, see John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1752-66 (1998)
(arguing in detail that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and William L. Prosser are the intellectual
sources of this model); and Stephen Perry, The Role of Duty of Care in a Rights-Based Theory of
Tort Law, in THE GOALS OF PRIvATE LAW (A. Robertson & H.W. Tang eds.) (forthcoming 2009).
7.
Numerous commentators and courts have noted this issue. For representative statements,
see James, supra note 4, at 44; E.W. Middleton, Jr., Damages: Loss of Prospective Profits
Recoverable in an Action for the Negligent Destruction of a Chattel, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 862 (1950);
and Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1513, 1525 (1985). For a particularly good judicial statement of this point, see Caltex
Oil (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," (1976) 136 C.L.R. 529, 556-84 (Austl.).
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resources to determine the appropriate treatment of relational economic loss. To
do this, I revisit the foundational relational economic loss cases and, in
particular, the decision that is generally recognized as the leading case in this8
area-Justice Holmes's judgment in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.
My aim will be to draw out and to clarify the reasoning that animates these
decisions and to determine whether they embody general principles of
negligence that can satisfactorily explain this area of tort law. My thesis is that
they do.
Given Robins's great influence, choosing it as a starting point for the
elaboration of a case-based alternative approach is natural and indeed required.
At first blush, however, the idea of looking to Robins for an alternative view to
the dominant approach that treats the exclusion of recovery as a policy-driven
limit on ordinary tort principles might seem odd and even doomed to failure,
seeing that both defenders and critics of the economic loss rule standardly
attribute this dominant rationale to Robins itself.9 At most, the alternative view
might be prescriptive. But this is not so. We will see that the actual reasoning in
Robins suggests an entirely different rationale for nonrecovery. It does not treat
claims for pure economic loss as governed by special considerations, let alone by
a special rule. Justice Holmes denied recovery on a basis that is generally
applicable to all losses, physical or financial, and that expresses a fundamental
and distinct requirement of negligence that, in addition to foreseeability, is a
basic positive prerequisite for liability. Nothing could be more alien to the
reasoning in Robins than the economic loss rule as it is currently understood.
This Article will proceed as follows. I begin in Part II by presenting and then
critically evaluating the currently prevailing explanation that views the law's
treatment of relational economic loss as a special rule that departs from general
principles of negligence. The discussion focuses on the influential account
proposed by Professor Fleming James, Jr.,' 0 which is the most familiar and also
the most intuitively straightforward illustration of this approach. James claims
that the nonrecovery of relational economic loss is a "pragmatic" limitation on
the ordinary principles of negligence,"1 and in particular, on foreseeability.12 I
argue that the approach, whether in James's version or more generally, is

8.
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). Courts and commentators
generally view Robins as the most influential economic loss case in American tort law. Thus,
Justice Breyer referred to Robins as the "leading 'pure financial injury' case," Barber Lines A/S v.
M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1985), and Gary Schwartz wrote that "Justice Holmes'
opinion [in Robins] has long been regarded as a leading source of the economic loss no liability
rule," Gary T. Schwartz, The Economic Loss Doctrine in American Tort Law: Assessing the Recent
Experience, in CIVIL LIABILITY FOR PURE EcONOMIC Loss 123 (E. Banakas ed., 1996).
9.
See Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51-53 (1st Cir. 1985); Louisiana
ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985). This view of Robins is
virtually unquestioned among tort scholars.
10. See James, supra note 4, at 44.
11. Id.at45.
12. Id.at 48.
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deficient both as an explanation of the settled law and as providing a rationale
that courts can reasonably apply in their usual adjudicative role. Indeed, far from
making sense of the long-standing denial of claims for relational economic loss,
the pragmatic rationale directly challenges the law and brings it into question. If
we are to account for the law, a different kind of justification is necessary.
Part III begins the central task of elaborating an alternative rationale. As
already indicated, I look to the leading economic loss cases themselves, and to
Robins in particular, for ideas and principles that can be worked up into a
coherent and plausible analysis of tort liability for relational economic loss. My
aim is to develop what-following John Rawls-may be called a "public basis
of justification." 3 In this context, the term "public" does not reflect a difference
between public and private law, but refers to the fact that the justification appeals
to fundamental normative ideas and principles that are publicly available and
accessible because they are present in the legal and political culture. Here, the
economic loss decisions themselves provide this publicly available fund of ideas.
A further requirement of a justification being public is that it must be capable of
being transparently and readily implemented by the appropriate institutions.
With respect to the nonrecovery rule, its justification must be suited to the
competence of courts in their usual adjudicative decision making role on a caseby-case basis.
In light of this aim, it is crucially important to let Robins speak for itself
instead of attributing to it views that are not part of its actual reasoning. My goal
is to clarify the understanding of liability that animated Robins. More
specifically, we need to identify and to assess the reason Justice Holmes required
actionable financial loss to flow from damage to something in which the plaintiff
has a proprietary or possessory interest. What is striking about the decision is
that it made no mention, either directly or indirectly, of the need to limit the
ordinary consequences of the foreseeability doctrine. In contrast to the judgment
of the court of appeals, any reference to foreseeability was absent. If the
requirement of a possessory or proprietary interest was not viewed as the upshot
of policy considerations that specifically apply to relational economic loss, why
was it relevant, let alone necessary? Justice Holmes explicitly presented it as a
requirement of justice that is completely distinct from foreseeability and that
does not reflect anything peculiar to loss being financial rather than physical. It
was, we will see, a purely juridical requirement: to be actionable, the plaintiff's
loss must result from defendant's interference with something that comes under

13. This Article is a first step in this direction. For Rawls's idea of such a "public
justification," see JoHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 26-29 (Erin Kelly ed.,
2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, RESTATEMENT]; and John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,

in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 593-94 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). I have discussed the idea of a
public justification for contract law in Peter Benson, Contractas a Transfer of Ownership, 48 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1673, 1693-1719 (2007), and in Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of
Justificationfor Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273 (1995).
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the former's exclusive rights as against the latter. The plaintiff's claim for
relational economic loss in Robins failed to satisfy this prerequisite of duty.
Once Justice Holmes's reason for the requirement of a
proprietary/possessory interest is properly understood, it becomes clear that,
contrary to the seemingly ubiquitous assessments of minority courts and
commentators, 14 Robins provides definite guidance as to the precise content and
reach of its principle. Liability can be assessed in terms that are readily
applicable on a case-by-case basis. I also show that the suggested rationale,
unlike the dominant policy-driven explanation, can answer all of the main
objections and alternative views of courts taking a minority view in opposition to
the traditional denial of relational economic loss. Such objections or alternatives
simply miss the mark. At the same time, it turns out-perhaps surprisingly-that
certain recent majority decisions, purporting to follow Robins, deny recovery in
circumstances where in fact Robins does not require this; conversely, the
imposition of liability by some leading minority decisions is explicable
consistently with Robins. In these instances, the current majority view has
overextended the reach of Robins because it misunderstands Robins's basis.
This last remark reflects a more general point that should be emphasized:
understood in the way I suggest, Robins does not bar economic loss claims as
such but denies only those that fail to meet its requirement. There is nothing
inherent about financial loss that makes it less actionable than physical loss. The
fact that fidelity to Robins does not imply a general denial of economic loss
claims opens up the possibility of there being situations where pure economic
loss can be recovered consistently with it. Such situations of recoverable
economic loss need not be viewed as "exceptions" to any "general" economic
loss rule. The different outcomes can be justified on a common basis. Part III
concludes with a brief discussion of the relation between Robins and some
settled instances of recoverable economic loss.
Part IV completes the elaboration of the alternative view by highlighting the
significance of the Robins principle within the larger law of negligence and by
clarifying its bearing on the theory of negligence. It addresses two main
questions: Does the ground for nonrecovery in Robins embody, as Justice
Holmes himself thought, a general requirement of principle presupposed
throughout the law of negligence? And if so, what is the relation between this
requirement and the doctrine of foreseeability in a general conception of
negligence? In answering these questions, I try to show not only that the Robins
principle is indeed fundamental to and pervasive in the law of negligence, but
also that it fits within a general rights-based conception of negligence which is
unlike the one ordinarily ascribed to Justice Holmes and evidenced in much of

14.

See infra text accompanying notes 56-61.
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his extra-judicial writing.' 5 Nonetheless, it is this conception, I contend, that best
illumines what courts do in physical and economic loss cases alike.
H.

THE PREVAILING EXPLANATION AND ITS DEFICIENCIES

In this Part, I explore the underlying premises of the prevailing justification
for the nonrecovery of relational economic loss and explain why it cannot
provide a satisfactory account of the law. My purpose is to show the need for a
fundamentally different approach. The problem, I suggest, lies not with what the
courts (for the most part) do with relational economic loss but with the current
interpretation and explanation of what they do.
First, let me briefly review the settled legal analysis of negligence claims for
relational economic loss. Recalling the bridge example,' 6 the defendant damages
something that the plaintiff neither owns nor possesses but in which the plaintiff
nevertheless has an interest-a contractual right against a third party or just a
liberty or privilege to use it. The plaintiff may even be the sole user of the
bridge. The plaintiffs financial loss may consist of additional costs or lost
profits that result when the bridge is no longer available for the plaintiff's use as
a consequence of the defendant's carelessness. This loss is relational because it
arises from damage to something other than the plaintiffs own person or
property. While the third-party owner of the bridge may recover for foreseeable
damage to the bridge and all foreseeable consequential financial loss (including
the costs, if applicable, of indemnifying the plaintiff under their contract), the
plaintiff may not recover any of the loss which the plaintiff sustains as a result of
not having the use of the bridge. This conclusion does not depend on whether
someone other than the plaintiff may successfully recover for the loss. It may be
that no one can recover for the loss inflicted. This analysis, as settled by the
influential nineteenth century English case of Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks
Co.17 and largely followed thereafter, categorically holds for any and all
relational economic loss.' 8

15. 1 say "much" because there are elements of this rights-based view in parts of his writings.
See infra Part W.A. For a good overview of Holmes's theoretical writings, see Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1753-56. Interestingly, and correctly in my view, these authors present
Robins as a departure from and a challenge to the dominant policy-driven model of negligence
which they see Justice Holmes himself as originating and defending in his extra-judicial writing. Id.
at 1832-33.
16. See supra p. 824. The case law is replete with economic loss negligence claims arising
from bridge closures. Such claims are invariably denied. See Leadfree Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 711 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. MIV Bayou Lacombe, 597
F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1979); Gen. Foods Corp. v. United States, 448 F. Supp. 111 (D. Md. 1978); Neb.
Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124 (Iowa 1984); Stop & Shop Cos.
v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1983); Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267 (N.J. 1945).
17. (1875) 10 Q.B. 453 (Eng.).
18. The following selection of well-known cases illustrates the range of relational economic
loss scenarios. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. MN Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (lst Cir. 1985)
(describing plaintiff who incurred extra costs when its vessel was prevented by defendant's
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While there have been a variety of scholarly efforts to explain the
nonrecovery decisions, by far the most influential and intuitively compelling
approach has been Professor Fleming James's pragmatic objection to recovery
for pure economic loss. 19 The pragmatic objection encapsulates and illustrates

negligent oil spill from docking at nearby berth owned by third party); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v.
MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985) (describing various plaintiffs, including shipping
interests, marina and boat operators, seafood enterprises, tackle and bait shops, and recreational
fishermen, who claimed financial losses sustained when Mississippi River Gulf outlet closed and
maritime activities were suspended due to threatened contamination to outlet caused by defendant's
negligence); The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927) (describing plaintiff employer who sued
for contractually required costs of treating employee injured by defendant's negligence), overruled
by Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 860 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1988); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. New York & N.H.R. Co., 25 Conn. 265 (1856) (involving plaintiff life insurer who sued
defendant for negligently causing insured's premature death); Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga.
1903) (involving plaintiff factory owner who sustained extra costs and lost profit when unable to
operate his plant as a result of defendant negligently interfering with electricity conduit owned by
third person who was contractually obliged to supply power to plaintiff); Stevenson v. E. Ohio Gas
Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946) (involving employee who sued for lost wages when
prevented from working at factory because of damage and danger to factory caused by defendant's
negligence); Coastal Conduit & Ditching, Inc. v. Noram Energy Corp., 29 S.W.3d 282 (Texas Ct.
App. 2000) (describing plaintiff excavator who incurred increased expense in performing contract
for third party as a result of defendant's alleged failure to bury electrical lines properly and mark
line locations); Leigh & Sillavan, Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1985] Q.B. 350 (Eng.)
(describing plaintiff buyer who suffered financial loss as a result of defendant damaging goods en
route at a time when the risk, but not the property in the goods, had passed to plaintiff); La Societe
Anonyme de Remorquage a Helice v. Bennetts, (1911) 1 K.B. 243 (Eng.) (involving plaintiff
tugboat owner who lost remuneration under towing contract when unable to complete towage of
ship that was sunk en route due to defendant's negligence); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766C illus. 1-4 (incorporating examples of relational economic loss).
19. James, supra note 4. An earlier important discussion of economic loss that suggested a
similar approach was P. Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss 83 L.Q.R. 248, 269-76 (1967).
Since James's article, the great majority of discussions have developed, refined, and revised the
policy analysis that he first set out in less elaborate but perhaps more accessible terms. The most
fully developed theoretical discussions of the rule take an economic standpoint. See W. Bishop,
Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Bishop, Economic Loss];
William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages: The Shortcomings of the
Pecuniary Loss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1986) [hereinafter Bishop & Sutton, Efficiency and
Justice]; Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort: Another Look at Robins
Dry Dock v. Flint, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1991); Ronen Perry, Relational Economic Loss: An
Integrated Economic Justification for the Exclusionary Rule, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 711 (2004)
[hereinafter Perry, Relational Economic Loss]; Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the
Low of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281 (1982). Articles that provide a noneconomic, policy-based
justification include Rabin, supra note 7, and Robert L. Rabin, Respecting Boundaries and the
Economic Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857 (2006) [hereinafter Rabin, Respecting
Boundaries], as well as the many articles by Jane Stapleton, including Comparative Economic Loss:
Lessons from Case-Lw-Focused 'Middle Theory', 50 UCLA L. REV. 531 (2002) [hereinafter
Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss], and Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda,
107 L.Q.R. 249 (1991). For a comparative, historical, and theoretical discussion, see JAMES
GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT
263-84 (2006). Exceptionally, a few articles take a "rights-based approach." See Allan Beever, A
Rights-Based Approach to the Recovery of Economic Loss in Negligence, 4 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 25 (2004); Benson, supra note 5; Russell Brown, Justifying the Impossibility
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both the strengths and the weaknesses of the prevailing approach. Indeed, when

courts during the past few decades have proposed justifications for the
nonrecovery of relational economic loss, they usually have referred to James's
explanation. 20 It is important to unpack its premises and see whether the

justification is sound.
The pragmatic objection starts from the general premise that tort "liability
should be imposed for the foreseeable consequences of negligence unless there is
''2 For pure economic
good reason for withholding it.
loss, there is such a reason.
The operation of negligence principles, particularly foreseeability, can lead to the
imposition of open-ended and crushing liability on defendants for even
momentary and trivial carelessness which results in pure economic loss. 22 Even
after fully compensating those who have sustained damage to person or to

property,

defendants

may find themselves

liable

for

vast

sums

of

indeterminate-and thus uninsurable-losses because of carelessness towards

plaintiffs alleging relational economic loss but who have not been injured or
even endangered as to person or property. 23 Holding defendants liable for such
losses would be grossly disproportionate to the wrongfulness of their act or

omission. From a societal point of view, the imposition of liability would be an
ineffective means of discouraging loss-creating activity or facilitating loss
spreading, particularly when insurance considerations are taken into account. A
general duty to avoid causing foreseeable relational economic loss could thus

potentially impose ruinous consequences on socially useful activity.
The source of this problem is the background social fact of the pervasive and

intricate interdependence of commercial and economic interests in modern
24

societies. Given this interdependence, it is foreseeable that damage to a
particular resource or facility can directly or indirectly cause economic losses
that are extensive or widespread (vast losses suffered by a vast number of

of Recoverable Relational Economic Loss, 5 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 155 (2005);
Stephen R. Perry, ProtectedInterests and Undertakings in the Law of Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO
L.J. 247 (1992) [hereinafter Perry, ProtectedInterests].
20. See, e.g., Mathiesen v. MN Obelix, 817 F.2d 345, 347 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing
James's "pragmatic approach"); Amoco Transport Co. v. S/S Mason Lykes, 768 F.2d 659, 668 (5th
Cir. 1985) (same); Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1022 (same); Getty Refining & Mktg. Co. v. MT FADI B,
766 F.2d 829, 832 (3d Cir. 1985) (same); Audio Odyssey Ltd. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 2d
951, 961 (S.D. Iowa 2003) (same); Furash & Co. v. McClave, 130 F. Supp. 2d 48, 57 (D.D.C. 2001)
(same); Getty Refining & Marketing Co. v. M/T Fadi B, 595 F. Supp. 452, 454 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(same).
21. James, supra note 4, at 48.
22. Id. at 50 (quoting Comment, Foreseeability of Third Party Economic Injuries-A
Problem in Analysis, 20 U. CHi. L. REv. 283, 298 (1953)).
23. Id.at 53.
24. The case law provides numerous statements concerning this fact of interdependence and
its consequences. See Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. New York & N.H.R. Co., 25 Conn. 265 (1856);
Byrd v. English, 43 SE. 419, 420 (Ga. 1903); Stevenson v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203
(Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Weller & Co. v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research Inst., (1966) 1 Q.B. 569
(Eng.).
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plaintiffs), as well as indeterminate or open-ended (losses that are qualitatively
and quantitatively unascertainable, given the indeterminate variety of interests
and the indeterminate number of plaintiffs that may be affected). 25 Courts and
commentators often note that, by contrast, in the typical case of physical loss it is
unusual for a single Fhysical injury to generate indeterminate and extensive
physical ripple effects.
Indeed, it seems unfair to hold a defendant responsible for the inherently
expansive and indeterminate economic losses that result just as much from the
social and commercial interdependence of interests as they do from the
defendant's momentary, and possibly very limited, carelessness. No individual is
responsible for this interdependence, which is to some extent advantageous to
all. Why not view such losses as the inevitable by-product of daily living in
modern society-the risk we all assume because we all benefit from the very
interdependence that makes this risk unavoidable and yet perfectly foreseeable?
Some such intuition seems to be presupposed in the determination that liability
for relational economic loss is disproportionate or unfair. Moreover, it seems
intuitively compelling that compensating for relational loss in general results in
economically perverse incentives, as the indeterminate and intrinsically
unlimited character of such loss is unrelated to the economic importance of the
defendant's activity and empties the notion of reasonable precautions of any
practical content.
Because the foreseeability requirement alone cannot avoid, but will
inevitably produce, such undesirable outcomes, 27 the second step of James's
pragmatic objection calls for a rule of policy to constrain the operation of the
28
ordinary negligence principles, particularly the doctrine of foreseeability.
According to the pragmatic objection, the requirement that recoverable economic
loss must result from physical injury to the plaintiff's person or property is just
such a limiting device. The rationale thus provides a purely instrumental
justification for the economic loss rule: the latter is justified to the extent, but
only to the extent, that it in fact accomplishes the goal of avoiding the imposition
of extensive and indeterminate liability.29

25. Both aspects are recognized in decisions and the literature. See Barber Lines A/S v. M/V
Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985); Rabin, supra note 7, at 1533.
26. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 7, at 1532 ("[A] negligent act rarely creates the prospect of
multiple physical harms. The careless driver or land occupant can only wreak so much havoc on
others; typically, the damage is limited to an unfortunate few.").
27. See, e.g., Rabin, Respecting Boundaries, supra note 19, at 864 ("(T]ort is threatened by
the implications of its own doctrinal substratum; namely, the oft-invoked concept of
foreseeability.").
28. See supra note 4. Perhaps the single most influential judicial statement of this view can
be found in Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating
that the economic loss rule is "a pragmatic limitation imposed by the Court upon the tort doctrine of
foreseeability").
29. See James, supra note 4, at 55.
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James's pragmatic objection to recovery thus represents an amalgam of
considerations of fairness and efficiency which, he contends, cumulatively argue
against recovery for relational economic loss. For the most part, subsequent
scholarly efforts have either elaborated on or refined these considerations as well
as their bearing on the desirability of recovery. Nevertheless, all these accounts
share serious difficulties. Let me elaborate.
In tension with the assertion that the imposition of liability for relational
economic loss is disproportionate to the wrong done and hence unfair, the
prevailing approaches also hold the contrary principle that fairness requires that
one who has caused reasonably foreseeable and avoidable loss should be held
responsible for it. As a matter of fairness, the gravity and the extent of a
defendant's culpability should reflect the seriousness-both in kind and
amount-of the foreseeable and thus avoidable consequences of his or her acts
and omissions. This establishes a sufficient basis for imposing liability. If losses
(whether physical or financial) are multiplied, so too, as a matter of justice,
should be remedies. 3° Moreover, even if no one is individually responsible for
the mutually beneficial social and economic interdependence that carries with it
the foreseeable risk of relational economic loss, the question remains as to why
those who happen to have a proprietary or possessory interest can recover such
loss, while those who do not have such an interest cannot. Why draw the line in
this way? Can't there be sufficiently direct and particularly foreseeable financial
loss that also comes within the ambit of recovery? As for the inefficiency of
allowing recovery, while there are certainly scenarios where this is true, recovery
is also denied in circumstances where it is not, or at least not clearly, so.
These internal tensions and questions point to the following basic difficulty.
As James himself noted, courts deny recovery even when it does not appear to
lead to any real danger of open-ended or excessive liability. 31 The very rationale
that is proposed for the rule thus leads to its rejection-or at most to only a
partial acceptance of it. 32 This reflects a fundamental underlying contrast
between the explanation and the law it purports to justify: whereas the pragmatic
rationale views the requirement of an interest in person or property merely as a
means of avoiding indeterminate liability, and therefore as justified only to the

30. For a typical statement of this view in a pure economic loss decision, see Holt Hauling &
Warehousing v. M/VMing Joy, 614 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D. Pa. 1985) (stating that in circumstances
of foreseeable loss "[each of [the] injured parties suffers a real loss for which tort law ought, in a
perfectly just world, to provide redress").
31. James, supra note 4, at 50-51. Other commentators have reached a similar conclusion.
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 165; DEAKIN ET AL., TORT LAW 83-86 (3d ed. 1994); GORDLEY,
supra note 19, at 280-84; Bishop & Sutton, Efficiency and Justice, supra note 19, at 352, 356, 360;
and John Fleming, Negligent Economic Loss in American Law, in NEGLIGENCE AFTER MURPHY V.
BRENTWOOD DC 30 (Legal Research Foundation ed., 1991).
32. See James, supra note 4, at 50-51 (concluding that the distinction between indirect
economic loss and physical loss is one that is "crude" and "unreliable," requiring reexamination if a
limitation on recovery for pragmatic reasons is to be retained). According to James, one of the
instances where the pragmatic objection does not apply is to the facts of Robins itself. Id. at 56.
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extent that it is needed to accomplish this purpose, the cases treat the requisite
interest as a per se requirement. The pragmatic explanation cannot make sense of
the categorical character of the requirement;
nor, in my view, do any of the more
33

recent versions of this approach.
There is a further basic problem with the pragmatic rationale. Courts-as
they themselves 34 and scholars 35 explicitly recognize-are simply unable to
apply the rationale on a case-by-case basis. They lack the institutional

competence and factual basis to decide whether or not particular instances of
economic loss raise the specter of indeterminate or extensive liability, given the
highly

complex and speculative factual determinations 36 and competing,

33. The divergence of the law and economic explanations is characteristic of the scholarly
literature on the economic loss rule. Thus, on the one hand, William Bishop writes that despite its
often decisive legal importance, the "fact that the plaintiff does not own property that has suffered
physical damage is economically irrelevant." Bishop, Economic Loss, supra note 19, at 25. On the
other hand, he asserts the economic relevance of other factors-such as whether a plaintiff's
economic loss represents a true social cost-that simply play no role in the actual reasoning in
Robins or in other leading decisions. Id. at 4. In a more recent article, Bishop and John Sutton posit
"allocative efficiency" and "corrective justice" as two goals and norms of tort law and argue that in
four out of eight paradigmatic fact situations considered, the unqualified operation of the economic
loss rule does not achieve either aim. Bishop & Sutton, Efficiency and Justice, supra note 19, at
347-48, 356-60. M.J. Rizzo ascribes decisive economic importance to whether a "channeling
contract" exists, or could have existed, between the plaintiff and the party whose person or property
is injured under which the latter is, or could have been, obliged to indemnify the former for his
economic loss. Rizzo, supra note 19, at 283-85, 291-96. However, the economic loss rule operates
irrespective of this factor. No leading case makes the actual or possible existence of a channeling
contract a prerequisite of the exclusionary rule. Ronen Perry suggests more than seven distinct and
sometimes competing economic considerations, none of which figures in Robins. Perry, Relational
Economic Loss, supra note 19, at 782. This divergence between the legal point of view and
economic analysis does not necessarily mean that the law on economic loss is incompatible with
economic norms. For a recent discussion of this issue in more general terms that argues for their
compatibility, see Mark A. Geistfeld, Efficiency and Fairness in Tort Law (N.Y. Univ. Law &
Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 48, 2006). It does mean, however, that these
explanations cannot illumine the law in its own framework and do not draw their ideas from the
public legal culture as expressed in these decisions. As such, these explanations do not fulfill the
first requirement of a public basis of justification. They are subject to the further difficulty of
requiring courts to make highly speculative and complex factual and policy determinations that are
beyond the courts' institutional competence. For this reason also, these explanations do not provide
a suitably public point of view.
34. See Barber Lines A/S v. MN Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 55 (lst Cir. 1985) ("We do not
know the answers to these questions nor can judges readily answer them in particular cases.");
Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1052 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting); Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978-80 (E.D. Va. 1981).
35. See, e.g., MORRIS & MORRIS, supra note 4, at 183 ("The danger of crushing damages can
only be avoided by arbitrary solutions. No formula can draw the line properly. The courts, without
data, are making arm-chair guesses concerning the ability of various classes of defendants to absorb
or spread these losses. Because these limits are set arbitrarily, it is not too difficult for later courts to
set them differently as their estimate of the strength of various classes of defendants or the
worthiness of various kinds of plaintiffs changes.").
36. A decision perhaps insufficiently aware of this point is Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d
558, 569-70 (9th Cir. 1974), which, as a result, received harsh criticism in R. Posner, Some Uses
and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 298-301 (1979).
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frequently incompatible, policy considerations which this assessment often
requires. If, as is the case, the pragmatic objection is the prevailing rationale for
the economic loss rule, at a practical level it is a rule without a justification that
can be implemented as part of the public reason of courts in their adjudicative
role. In other words, the pragmatic objection does not provide a public basis of
justification. Precisely because the pragmatic rationale does not give courts
definite and practicable grounds to determine the parameters of the rule in
37
particular instances, they must fall back on a bright line interpretation of it,
detached from the very sorts of evaluations which the pragmatic rationale
requires. But given the stated tension between the economic loss rule and settled
general principles of negligence that would otherwise govern-including the
inevitable denial of meritorious claims that do not raise the specter of
indeterminate liability-this is clearly an undesirable and unstable situation for
any rational system of law.
In addition to bringing into question the very rule it purports to justify, the
pragmatic objection makes inevitable attempts to articulate an alternative
treatment of relational economic loss that serves the goals set out by that
justification without sacrificing ordinary tort values. Hence there is the call for a
more reliable and finely tuned set of criteria, instead of the majority position's
single prerequisite of a proprietary or possessory interest. The minority position
comprises precisely those courts that, although sharing the pragmatic concern
about indeterminate or widespread liability, decline to view the absence of a
proprietary or possessory interest as the sole decisive factor. Instead, these courts
treat a proprietary interest as just one possible factor that may, depending on the
particular38 circumstances of a given case, correlate with the risk of indeterminate
liability.
It is not surprising, then, that commentators and courts have come to see this
area of negligence as one beset by internal tensions and raising some of the most
difficult issues in negligence practice and theory. 39 Indeed, a growing number of

37. For a typical statement of this position, see Allders International(Ships) Ltd. v. U.S.,
1995 WL 251571, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1995) ("Most courts have read Robins Dry Dock to
establish a bright line rule against recovery for economic loss caused by an unintentional maritime
tort absent physical damage to property."). The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECONOMIC
TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS falls back on a bright-line justification for no liability in cases such
as Robins where claimants incur pure economic loss as a result of having a contractual interest in
the damaged item. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS

§ 8 cmt. b, at 7 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006). The same approach now dominates English
jurisprudence. See Leigh & Sillavan, Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1985] Q.B. 350 (Eng.).
38. See Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1035-53 (Wisdom, J., dissenting); People Express Airlines,
Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985). Perhaps the most thoughtful statement
of this minority opinion is Justice Stephen's opinion in Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge
"Willenstad", (1976) 136 C.L.R. 529, 556-84 (Austl.).
39.

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS,

Reporter's Memorandum, at xi (Council Draft No. 1, 2006) ("Economic negligence is the most
unsettled field in American tort law today."); B.S. Markesinis, An Expanding Tort Law-The Price
of a Rigid Contract Law, 103 L.Q.R. 354, 354 (1987) ("[Tlhe theoretical difficulties associated
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foreign common law jurisdictions have now jettisoned, or at least substantially
revised, the economic loss rule. 40 Unless we can justify the treatment of pure
economic loss in terms that do not stand against-but rather reflect-basic
principles of tort law which courts can readily implement in their usual
adjudicative role, it is not clear that the rule will-or more importantly, shouldbe retained. We seem to have reached an impasse regarding the economic loss
rule.
There is a paradox here. Despite challenges by scholars and some courts, as
well as the problems with the prevailing pragmatic rationale, the denial of
recovery for even foreseeable pure economic loss in a variety of circumstances
remains overwhelmingly the majority view in American tort law, both in federal
and state courts. 4 1 Historically, this denial of recovery for pure economic loss
was settled by a virtually uninterrupted series of consistent decisions for over a
century that developed, even in its details, along similar lines in both the British
Commonwealth and in the United States. 42 Courts took this denial of pure
economic recovery to its logical conclusion, generalizing its principle and
fleshing out its full scope and application.4 3 Strikingly, the courts that did this
were the very ones that, during this same period, created the modern law of
neglence, giving full effect to the doctrine of foreseeability in cases of physical
loss. In settling the question of liability for pure economic loss, these courts did
not view the determination of liability as either particularly difficult or
controversial. In fact, most of the early cases that formulated and elaborated the
economic loss rule did so without making pragmatic considerations the explicit
basis.45 This was widely so in American, English, and Commonwealth decisions.
Instead, the courts typically said, without further explanation, that relational
economic loss was indirect loss and that such loss was not recoverable, being
damnum absque injuria-aninjury without any injustice. 46 Often, courts noted
the complete absence of legal precedent for recovery-despite the fact that such
losses must frequently occur-and took this as evidence of the doubtfulness of
the claims.47 Even more interestingly, when, exceptionally, certain of these

with ... economic loss cases place them indisputably in the first rank of problem areas of modem
tort law.").
40. For a good survey, see Karen Hogg, Negligence and Economic Loss in England,
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand,43 INT'L &COMP. L.Q. 116 (1994).
41. See sources cited infra note 56.
42. See, e.g., James, supra note 4, at 45 (noting the "remarkable parallel between the
American decisions on [indirect economic loss] and those in the British Commonwealth").
43. See, e.g., id. at 44-47 (discussing the difference in treatment between indirect economic
loss and physical damage).
44. See id. at 46-47; see also Barber Lines A/S v. MN Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 53 (1st
Cir. 1985) ("The same judges who removed other recovery limitations left this one firmly in
place.").
45. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 5, at 427.
46. Id.
47. In the landmark English case of Cattle v. Stockton, for example, Lord Blackburn justified
the denial of recovery on the ground that "[n]o authority in favour of the plaintiff's right to sue was
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founding decisions did refer to the consequences that might result from finding
liability-the same consequences which are the concern of the pragmatic
objection-they made clear that this was not the basis for denying recovery:
"The magnitude of these consequences must not be allowed to deprive the
plaintiffs of their rights, but it emphasizes the importance of the case. ' 4 8 With
some notable exceptions, explicit judicial
endorsement of the pragmatic rationale
9
is a relatively recent phenomenon.
The fact that these earlier decisions did not rely on the pragmatic objection
or on other policy rationales, but instead excluded recovery categorically without
much explanation, does not necessarily mean that they viewed the economic loss
rule as an exception to, or in tension with, the general principles of negligence
that these courts were simultaneously developing. Another explanation is
possible: they may have regarded recovery for relational economic loss as
directly incompatible with certain ultimate premises that must be presupposed
for there to be any liability in negligence. The courts took these premises as
given and uncontroversial-without the need to discuss or justify them
expressly. Now, the more basic and more pervasive a premise is, the less one
should expect courts ordinarily to draw explicit attention to it or to seek support
for it in precedent. The premise is simply presupposed. Nevertheless, it is the
mark of a great judgment that, in order to resolve the particular issue at hand, it
brings out more explicitly the deeper connection between premise and

cited, and, as far as our knowledge goes, there was none that could have been cited." Cattle v.
Stockton Waterworks Co., (1875) 10 Q.B. 453.
48. Weller & Co. v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research Inst., (1966) 1 Q.B. 569 (Eng.). For still
earlier explicit statements of this approach, see Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419, 420 (Ga. 1903), and
particularly Simpson & Co. v. Thomson, 3 A.C. 279, 289-90 (Privy Council 1877) (Lord Penzance).
49. One of the first decisions in which the pragmatic objection is the explicit basis for the
denial of recovery is Stevenson v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946).
Courts and commentators regularly cite Judge Cardozo's influential words-"in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class"-from Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) as the example of judicial recognition of the pragmatic objection.
See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1039 (5th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Judge Cardozo); James, supra note 4, at 45 (same). This, however, is incorrect. Cardozo's reference
to indeterminacy does not reflect the pragmatic objection. Instead, it concerns the reasonable basis
for holding a defendant responsible for a third party's reliance on a defendant's statements or
representations. It goes to the existence of a tort duty in circumstances of reliance. According to
Cardozo, a prerequisite of such a duty is that the plaintiff must be able reasonably to view the
defendant as intending the plaintiff's reliance. Ultramares Corp., 174 N.E. at 447. But, and this is
the crucial point, plaintiffs cannot reasonably impute to a defendant an intention to assume an
indeterminate responsibility absent clear positive evidence to that effect. Hence, in such
circumstances, there is neither duty nor liability. Cardozo expresses the very same point in the
contract decision of Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 157 N.E. 140, 141 (N.Y. 1927),
where, paralleling the misrepresentation cases in negligence, the issue is whether the defendant
assumed responsibility for the consequences of breach under the doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale.
See Peter Benson, Should White v. Jones Represent CanadianLaw: A Return to First Principles,in
EMERGING ISSUES IN TORT LAW 164-65 (J. Neyers et al. eds., 2007). Goldberg and Zipursky also
seem to share this rights-based interpretation of Ultramares.See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note
6, at 1832-33.
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conclusion, thereby presenting in a clearer light the conception of liability that is
at work in its own decision as well as in previous cases. Indeed, a hallmark of the
modern development of negligence is that, instead of embedding legal analysis
in the opaque framework of the forms of action, courts began to articulate more
general and abstract conceptions of the legal relations that give rise to rights and
duties in tort. Robins, which also belongs to this period, is a judgment of this
order. Or so I will now try to show.
III.

THE REASON FOR No RECOVERY: JURIDICAL, NOT POLICY

In this Part, I present a rationale for relational economic loss being per se
nonactionable in negligence. Reflecting the idea of a public basis of justification,
this rationale is drawn from the principles and values both explicitly articulated
and latent in the economic loss cases. We ask whether there is a unifying and
publicly available basis that provides a coherent account of this historically
settled area of tort law. First, I argue that such a rationale is expressly put
forward in Robins. This rationale is juridical or rights-based, not policy-driven as
in the prevailing explanation. Given the common disagreement about Robins and
its principle, it is crucial to determine the decision's precise metes and bounds,
both in what it requires and in what it does not. Second, I show how this
principle provides a complete and definitive answer to alternative tests of
liability advocated by minority courts and by foreign common law jurisdictions
critical of the traditional treatment of economic loss. This is something the
prevailing explanation has failed to do. Third, I briefly discuss how situations of
nonactionable relational economic loss differ from other situations of pure
economic loss where there can be recovery. By way of illustration, I focus on
two central instances of recovery. I suggest that there is no need to view these as
"exceptions" to an economic loss rule. Rather, these different outcomes can be
consistently explained within a single framework.
A.

The Principleand Reach of Robins

In Robins, the plaintiffs were time-charterers of a vessel owned by-and in
the possession of-a third party. 50 While the vessel was being dry-docked for its
semi-annual inspection, the defendant, who had contracted with the owner to
inspect and to service the vessel, carelessly damaged the propeller, making
repairs necessary and thereby causing additional delay before the vessel returned
to service. 51 The charter party agreement between the plaintiffs and the thirdparty owner suspended the plaintiffs' obligation to pay hire while the vessel was
out of service. 52 Nevertheless, the plaintiffs sustained lost profits because of their

50.
51.
52.

Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307 (1927).
Id.
Id.
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inability to use the vessel as planned.53 The plaintiffs brought an action in

negligence for pure economic loss. 54 Reversin the plaintiffs' victory in the
Second Circuit, Justice Holmes denied recovery.
Even though Robins was a decision in admiralty, the great majority of
federal and state courts continue to follow Robins as a matter of common law
negligence. 56 It is therefore paradoxical, and indeed troubling, that courts and

scholars currently disagree over the parameters and scope of the decision. Some
courts, particularly those which seek to limit or circumvent the decision, see
Robins as confined to negligent interference with third-party contractual

relations 57 or to only certain kinds of financial loss, such as lost profits as

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.at309-10.
56. Robins is endorsed (though sometimes with settled and limited exceptions) by the First,
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See Allders Int'l
(Ships) Ltd. v. United States, No. 95-6138, 100 F.3d 942, 1996 WL 19149, at *1 (2nd Cir. Jan. 16,
1996); Channel Star Excursions v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 77 F.3d 1135 (9th Ci. 1996); Barber Lines
A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985); Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. MT FADI B, 766
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985);
All-Iowa Contracting Co. v. Linear Dynamics, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 969 (N.D. Iowa 2003); Orgulf
Transp. Co. v. Hill's Marine Enters., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (S.D. I11. 2002); Furash & Co. v.
McClave, 130 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2001); In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669 (E.D.
Mich. 1992); Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 667 F.2d 34 (1 1th Cir. 1982). The Fourth Circuit
has stated that "without question, the Robins Dry Dock principle is alive and well in the Fourth
Circuit," Yarmouth Sea Products Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 398 (4th Cit. 1997), but the leading
case is Venore Transp. Co. v. MV Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978), which proposes a very
different, and arguably incompatible, approach to the question of limitations upon liability for pure
economic loss. With respect to state courts, once again the great majority embrace the Robins rule.
There are some decisions, however, which reject Robins and lead the minority view. See, e.g.,
Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d. 356 (Alaska 1987) (adopting a rule permitting
recovery for purely economic losses); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979)
("Where a special relationship exists between the parties, a plaintiff may recover for loss of
expected economic advantage through the negligent performance of a contract although the parties
were not in contractual privity."); Hawthorne v. Kober Constr. Co., 640 P.2d 467 (Mont. 1982)
(finding plaintaiff can maintain an action for negligence in the performance of duties growing out of
contract, even where no privity of contract existed); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 118 (N.J. 1985) ("[A] defendant who has breached his duty of care to
avoid the risk of economic injury to particularly foreseeable plaintiffs may be held liable for actual
economic losses that are proximately caused by its breach of duty."). More recently, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia qualified the economic loss rule by drawing upon these minority
decisions and allowing recovery for pure economic loss where there exists a "special relationship"
between plaintiff and defendant whereby the particular plaintiff is affected differently from society
in general. Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 587-92 (2000). For helpful overviews of the law, see
David Owen, Recovery for Economic Loss Under U.S. Maritime Law: Sixty Years Under Robins
Dry Dock, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157 (1987), and Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 19,
at 716-32. See also Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort Law, 2008 U. ILL. REv. 1573, 157879 (2008) (noting that both federal and state courts have generally embraced Robins).
57. See, e.g., Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1039-40 (Wisdom, J., dissenting) ("In limiting recovery
in a chain of contractual relations, the Supreme Court drew the line after the first claim for damages.
Justice Holmes had thus fashioned a rule in claims arising from a chain of contracts that would
avoid a multiplicity of actions and prevent a vast extension of liability."); Hercules Carriers, Inc. v.
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opposed to wasted expenses. 58 Other courts, especially those that endorse the
majority position and interpret the economic loss rule as a bright line rule, view
Robins as requiring actual physical damage to one's property to find liability for
resulting economic loss. 59 Commentators criticize Robins for failing to provide

Florida, 720 F.2d 1201, 1203 (11 th Cir. 1983) (Clark, J., concurring) ("In Robins and Byrd, plaintiff
A was in contract with party B, who failed to deliver contracted for benefits to A because of
interference from tortfeasor C. Since A's injury resulted from B's failure to perform his contractual
obligations, A's remedy, if any, is against B on the contract, and not against C, who cannot be
touched for want of privity. The instant case, however, is solely a matter of tort. There is only
plaintiff A who has suffered economic loss at the hands of tortfeasor C. There is no party B, no
contract upon which A might base a claim for recovery, and no privity bar to an action against C.");
Fed. Commerce & Navigation Co. v. M/V Marathonian, 528 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1975) ("The
Robins rule appears to be based on a contract theory, denying relief to one injured by negligent
interference with contract."); In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1968) ("We
therefore prefer to leave the rock-strewn path of 'negligent interference with contract' for more
familiar tort terrain."); Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 981 (E.D. Va. 1981)
(denying plaintiffs recovery for indirect economic harm because economic losses were not
foreseeable and were too remote).
58. See, e.g., Amoco Transport Co. v. S/S Mason Lykes, 768 F.2d 659, 669 (5th Cir. 1985)
(permitting cargo owners to recover actual, out of pocket expenses incurred directly from collision);
Struma, 583 F.2d at 710-11 (permitting claim for damages for loss of use); J. Ray McDermott &
Co. v. SS Egero, 453 F.2d 1202, 1204 (5th Cir. 1972) (permitting claim for reimbursement of
expenses incurred under subcontract as a result of project being delayed, but indicating that claim
for lost profits that might have been earned would be barred by Robins). James Gordley has
suggested that economic losses involving extra cost, in contrast to lost profit, should be recoverable
because unlike the latter the former are less variable and more unpredictable. See GORDLEY, supra
note 19, at 284. For a similar position, see Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 19, at 784.
59. See, e.g., Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. MT FADI B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1985)
("[Wihere the negligence does not result in physical harm, thereby providing no basis for an
independent tort, and the plaintiff suffers only pecuniary loss, he may not recover for the loss of the
financial benefits of a contract or prospective trade."); Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1023 ("[T]here could
be no recovery for economic loss absent physical injury to a proprietary interest .... "). Other than
Testbank, Getty contains the most frequently cited statement of this physical damage requirement.
Several other cases have approved of and applied the language in Getty. See, e.g., Reserve Mooring
Inc. v. Am. Commercial Barge Line, LLC, 251 F.3d 1069, 1072 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Like the plaintiff
in [Getty], Reserve cannot escape the fact that Defendants' negligence did not result in physical
damage to Reserve's mooring facility .. "); In re Oriental Republic of Uru., 821 F. Supp. 934,
937-40 (D. Del. 1993) (approving and applying Getty); Consol. Rail Corp. v. M/T Hoegh Forum
630 F. Supp. 83, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("[A]s in Getty .... no physical damages is alleged to the pier
and defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law."); see also In re Taira
Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 5, LLC, 444 F.3d 371, 377 (5th Cir. 2006) (affirming the "economic loss
rule" that there can be no recovery for pure economic loss without physical injury to a proprietary
interest); BP W. Coast Prods., LLC v. Alaska Tanker Co., No. C03-0727L, 2003 WL 23335932, at
*1-*2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 24, 2003) (same); Maersk Line Ltd. v. CARE, 271 F. Supp. 2d 818, 824
(E.D. Va. 2003) (same); In Re One Meridian Plaza Fire Litig., 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1487 (E.D. Pa.
1993) ("As a practical matter, 'physical harm' suggests some physical contact or damage. Denial of
access does not fit within this standard."). But see Sekco Energy, Inc. v. MV Margaret Chouest,
820 F. Supp. 1009, 1011-12 (E.D. La. 1993) (citations omitted) (attributing incorrectly to Robins
the idea that there must be physical damage but then correctly holding that where an ownership
interest is interfered with, there is sufficient ground for liability even in the absence of "physical"
damage).
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any reasons for the denial of recovery, 60 or they simply read in the kinds of
pragmatic concerns discussed earlier, with the accompanying criticism that such
61
concerns did not seem to apply to the particular circumstances of the case.
Robins remains a puzzle and a problem despite its authority and influence.

To understand Robins and its reasoning, it is important, first, to identify the
precise point of disagreement between the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit. 6 There was no disagreement over the facts. Moreover, both courts
agreed that, as time-charterers, the plaintiffs did not have a possessory or

proprietary interest in the vessel. 63 Additionally, the plaintiffs were not thirdparty beneficiaries of the employment contract between the defendants and the
owners of the vessel. 64 Finally, both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court
assumed that the mere foreseeability of the economic loss would not by itself

justify the liability of the defendants. 65 What, then, was the basis of their
disagreement?
The starting point of the court of appeals' analysis was that the defendant
should be responsible for the whole of the lost use of the vessel during the
additional dry-dock time. 66 Because "the measure of the total recovery is the

market value of the loss of the use" of the vessel, the defendant's "liability for its
67
tortious act is for the actual damage done to the combined interests in the ship.,

This, the court emphasized, involved "no injustice to [defendant]., 68 To the
contrary, because the defendant's negligence "directly affected several parties,
each is entitled to his just share of the total amount,, 69 irrespective of whether he
had a proprietary or possessory interest in the vessel. If there had been no
agreement between the charterer and the owner, the owner would have
sustained-and recovered-the whole loss himself.70 The charter party which

60. See Bishop & Sutton, Efficiency and Justice, supra note 19, at 352-53 ("Holmes merely
asserts that pure economic loss is not recoverable and on that ground overturns the decision of the
Court of Appeals. Of course, [Justice] Mack [of the court of appeals] was perfectly aware of the
general rule and was seeking to justify an exception on rational criteria. This argument Justice
Holmes did not even attempt to answer."); Goldberg, supra note 19, at 256 ("Two things should be
noted about Holmes's opinion. First, it is short on justification. Flint could recover if it had a
property interest; it did not; ergo, no recovery. There is no attempt to question the doctrines that, in
Holmes's perception, bar recovery."). The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECONOMIC TORTS
AND RELATED WRONGS states that Justice Holmes "appears to have thought it self-evident" that
there is no liability for pure economic loss. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND
RELATED WRONGS § 8,Reporter's Note (a), at 30 (Council Draft No. 1,2006).
61. See James, supra note 4, at 56.
62. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Flint v. Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1926).
63. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 308; Flint, 13 F.2d at 5.
64. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 307; Flint, 13 F.2d at 4-5.
65. Flint, 13 F.2d at 6.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id. (emphasis added)
68. Id.
69. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
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divided up the total loss between the owner and plaintiffs should not, the court
reasoned, affect the defendant's liability for the loss: "The wrongdoer has no
interest in and should not benefit because of the contractual obligations of the
shipowner to the charterer, or the absence of any liability of the owner to the
charterer for [defendant's] negligence."'7 Moreover, unless the defendant
compensated the plaintiffs, there would be a portion of the total amount of lost
use which no one would recover, even though it resulted from the defendant's
negligence. The court distinguished past decisions denying recovery for pure
economic loss, as they involved indirect losses that were deemed too remote.72
Here, not only were the results "reasonably to be anticipated, ' 73 but the
wrongdoer "directly affected" 74 the plaintiffs, presumably because-like the

owner-the plaintiffs had an interest in the use of the vessel and it was this use
that the defendant directly affected.
The central premise of the court of appeals' judgment is clear: the defendant
is responsible for negligent interference with the use of the vessel as such and
whoever foreseeably
•
• •75is using it has standing to sue the defendant for its loss
occasioned by this interference. To have such standing, the plaintiff need not
be in a relation of rights with the defendant regarding such use, as long as the
item is owned at least by someone. Here, not having possession of or property in
the vessel, the plaintiffs' only legal relation with respect to the vessel was their
contract with the ship owner; but the contract gave the plaintiffs a right to use of
the vessel as against the ship owner only, not the defendant. Despite the
complete absence of a legal relation of rights between the plaintiffs and
defendant with respect to their interest, the court of appeals concluded that the
defendant still owed plaintiffs a duty in negligence to avoid injuring the
plaintiffs' interest.
Against this entire line of reasoning, Justice Holmes answered simply and
clearly that "justice does not permit the [defendant] to be charged with the full
value of the loss of use unless there is some one who has a claim to it as against

the [defendant]."76 For the defendant's interference with the use of the vessel to
be a wrong against the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' interest, Justice Holmes insisted,
must be founded upon a right (or "claim ' 77) as against the defendant. Only then

71. Id. at 5.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id. In taking this approach, the court of appeals endorsed what I call a "transferred loss"
model of analysis which has subsequently been adopted by some minority position courts and
scholars who challenge the traditional denial of relational economic loss. See supra notes 113-17,
123-25 and accompanying text.
76. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309 (1927) (emphasis added).
77. Holmes's use of the term "claim" is consistent with its meaning "a right." Interestingly,
Hohfeld, writing prior to the Robins decision, suggested that the term "claim" should be used
instead of right to avoid confusing the latter with other juridical conceptions. See W.N. HOHFELD,
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 38 (1923).
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would the plaintiff have a legally protected interest in that use to assert against
the defendant in negligence. 7By implication, the fact that someone else, such as

the third-party owner, might have such an interest, or the fact that the plaintiffs
might have this interest against some third party, could not satisfy this
requirement. To state a cause of action, the plaintiffs' complaint must be founded
on their own protected interest, not another's, and that interest must be against
the defendant, not someone else. Apart from the requisite legal relation between
the parties, the use of the vessel was not a protected interest in negligence. Since

the plaintiffs lacked the necessary right in rem or in personam against the

defendant, the plaintiffs' claim must be denied. 79 Holmes's disagreement with
the court of appeals could not have been more fundamental.
What is conspicuously absent from Robins is any discussion of the sorts of
considerations that make up the pragmatic objection to liability.80 There is no
mention of remoteness. Moreover, the Court did not premise the denial of
recovery on the loss being financial, as if the financial character would make the
loss less suitable or worthy as an item of compensation. Rather, the Court
decided liability by asking a simple threshold question: Can the plaintiffs show
that their loss resulted from the defendant impairing something that comes under

the plaintiffs' rights-whether in rem or in personam-against the defendant? 81
Having a property or possessory interest in the vessel would entail having a right
to the use of the vessel that is exclusive as against the defendant, and having

78. Robins, 275 U.S. at 309.
79. ld. at 309-10.
80. It is noteworthy that any reference to such policy considerations is similarly absent in
Holmes's extra-judicial comments about the case in his correspondence with Frederick Pollock.
Justice Holmes wrote:
I have just finished a fairly interesting case in which a time charterer of a vessel tries to
get damages from a dry dock company, for negligent delay in repairs per quod the
charterer lost a fortnight of valuable time. I have no doubt that he can't recover but I have
not yet heard from my brethren. Perhaps I should explain that there was no demise of the
ship, that the owner remained in possession and put the vessel into dry dock without
reference to the charter, having a right to do so by the terms of the instrument.
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Sir Frederick Pollock (Dec. 7, 1927), in I HOLMESPOLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK, 1874-1932, at 207-08 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961).
81. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 309 (citing The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313, 313 (2d Cir. 1927),
overruled by Black v. Red Star Towing & Transp. Co., 860 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1988); Byrd v. English,
43 S.E. 419, 420 (Ga. 1903); Elliott Steam Tug Co. v. Shipping Controller, (1922) 1 K.B. 127, 13940 (Eng.)). This same rights-based analysis is found in Byrd:
The plaintiff is suing on account of an alleged tort by reason of which he was deprived of
a supply of electric power with which to operate his printing establishment. What was his
right to that power supply? Solely the right given him by virtue of his contract with the
Georgia Electric Light Company, and with that contract the defendants are not even
remotely connected.
Byrd, 43 S.E. at 420. Justice Holmes cited Byrd as a "good statement" of the applicable rule.
Robins, 275 U.S. at 309 (citing Byrd, 43 S.E. at 420).
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such a right seems to be a prerequisite of the loss being actionable. 82 This, and
not an instrumental concern about indeterminate liability, was the reason the
Court gave for the requirement of a proprietary or possessory interest. Thus,
Justice Holmes viewed wrongs in negligence as done in relation to others who

83

have rights against the wrongdoer with respect to the very interest affected.
This relationship is the core idea in Robins, and Justice Holmes took it to be a

requirement of justice. 84
We can now understand the significance of Holmes's conclusion that the
plaintiffs' claim had to be worked out-if at all-through their contract with the
ship owner. 85 The conclusion did not follow, as some have claimed, from an idea
of the primacy of contract 86 or from an efficiency rationale that requires
plaintiffs to "channel" their claims through their contracts with third-party
owners. 87 It was simply the upshot of Holmes's rights-based analysis. If, as

Robins requires, the plaintiffs' claim must be based on their rights and if the
plaintiffs' only right to the use of the vessel is their contractual right against the
owner, the contract, and only this, can be the basis of any action. As I will now

82. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 309 (citing Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d at 313; Byrd, 43 S.E. at 420;
Elliott Steam Tug, 1 K.B. at 139-40.
83. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 308 ("The injury to the propeller was no wrong to the
respondents but only to those to whom it belonged.").
84. The Second Circuit clearly understood this view in Agwilines Inc. v. Eagle Oil &
Shipping Co., 153 F.2d 869, 871 (1946). Judge Learned Hand explained:
When [Robins] was before us, we held that, although the charterer had had no proprietary
interest in the ship and no contract with the drydocker, the drydocker could not protect
himself by the ordinary doctrine that a tortfeasor is not liable for remote damages,
because the whole loss from detention of the ship was to be apprehended from his lack of
care, whether the owner bore it all, or shared it with a charterer; and that, the whole loss
being therefore a direct consequence of his negligence, he should not be allowed to cut
down his liability ....

To all of this the Supreme Court said "no."..... The Court thought

it irrelevant that this resulted in exonerating the drydocker from nearly all liability
through the fortuity that the profitable use of the ship had been divided between the
owner and charterer: the difficulty went deeper; the drydocker had committed no legal
wrong against the charterer at all, though he had caused it serious damage.
Agwilines, 153 F.2d at 871 (citations omitted) (citing Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13
F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1926), rev'd, 275 U.S. 303). See also Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d
708, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1978) (Winter, J., dissenting), which clearly and consistently states the basis
of Robins in these terms.
85. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 308.
86. It is worth mentioning here that the primacy of contract is often suggested as the reason
for the non-recovery of economic loss in the defective products cases. See, e.g., East River S.S.
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986) (discussing the need to keep contract law
and products liability law in separate spheres to maintain limits on damage awards). I do not think
that this is the most satisfactory way to explain these cases. While I cannot discuss this type of
economic loss in this Article, I have suggested elsewhere that the defective product cases may also
be explained on a basis similar to the proposed analysis of Robins: in the scenarios where recovery
is denied, the plaintiff's economic interest in having a non-defective product does not rest on any
exclusive right as against the defendant. There is no need to invoke the primacy of contract,
however construed. See Benson, supra note 5, at 436-37.
87. See Rizzo, supra note 19, at 283; supra note 33.
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explain, this rights-based analysis can also resolve current uncertainty and
disagreement over the exact content and reach of Robins-something the
prevailing pragmatic justification is unable to do.
First, the exclusion of liability in Robins is not, and indeed cannot be,
limited

to cases

relationships.

88

of negligent

interference

with third-party

contractual

The defendant is not liable whenever a plaintiff's interest in the

damaged thing is less than a right-whether proprietary, possessory, or
contractual-against the defendant. Thus, the denial of liability applies not just

where the plaintiffs only interest in the claimed item is a contractual right
against a third party, but also where the plaintiff's interest is merely a liberty or a

privilege to use it. Because such interests fall short of a right (claim) against
the defendant, financial loss resulting from the defendant's interference with
them must be nonrecoverable under Robins-no differently than interference
with contractual interests.
Second, Justice Holmes assumed that whether a plaintiff has the requisite

proprietary or possessory interest depends upon settled legal principles (for
example, the law of property) that define these interests and determine their
existence independently of their possible role in tort law. What Robins definitely

rejects is the idea of creating a protected interest out of nothing just to
accomplish the aims of tort law. Thus, in Robins, it was the law of admiralty

governing charter parties that determined the existence and the character of the
plaintiffs' interest: being a time-charterer rather than a demise-charterer, the
plaintiffs lacked a possessory or proprietary right in the damaged vessel. 9°
Justice Holmes took this determination as conclusive in deciding whether the
9
plaintiffs had the needed in rem right to found their claim in negligence. '
Following Robins, it would not suffice for the plaintiff's interest to display
features "akin to" or "equivalent to" those of ownership or possession if these
features would not qualify the interest as a valid in 92rem right according to
relevant general principles of law apart from negligence.

88. This is correctly noted in the leading majority view decisions. See Barber Lines A/S v.
MV Dona Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752
F.2d 1019, 1023-24 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903)).
89. See HOHFELD, supra note 77, at 38-39. According to Hohfeld, the fact that a plaintiff has
a liberty or privilege to use something simply entails, by definition, that the plaintiff does no wrong
in making use of it, in contrast to having a right to such use that imposes upon others a correlative
duty of noninterference. See id.
90. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 308-09.
91. See id.
92. Most decisions are consistent with this approach. See, e.g., IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E.
Lee SS, 993 F.2d 1193, 1194 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that there was no property interest where the
plaintiff had exclusive access to leased pipelines and where the plaintiff had preferential docking
rights at the damaged berth but where the plaintiff did not own the damaged berth); Tex. E. Transp.
Corp. v. McMoran Offshore Exploration Co., 877 F.2d 1214, 1225 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
there was no property interest where gas producer maintained appurtenances to a pipeline through
which it transported its oil but where the producer did not own the pipeline); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. M/V Bayou Lacombe, 597 F.2d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that a contract
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Third, Robins applies to any kind of financial loss to the plaintiff which
results from the plaintiff being deprived of the use or benefit of something which
the plaintiff neither owns nor possesses. So in Robins, had the plaintiffs' loss
been wasted hire rather than lost profit, the action against the defendant would
have failed for the same reason. 93 The hire would have been paid under a

contract with the vessel owner, which in itself cannot give the plaintiffs any right
against the defendant, and the hire would have been wasted because the plaintiffs
could not use the vessel during the additional delay-but the plaintiffs still
would have had no right to such use as against the defendant. The only relevant

criterion for distinguishing recoverable from nonrecoverable financial loss is the
juridical consideration of whether a given loss results from interference with the
plaintiffs rights as against the defendant.
Fourth, the rationale for nonrecovery has nothing to do with remoteness or
foreseeability of loss as these concepts are ordinarily understood in the law of
negligence. 94 The fact that the defendant foreseeably impairs some interest of the

plaintiff does not establish that the plaintiff's interest is founded upon a right
(proprietary, possessory, or contractual) as against the defendant. Conceptually
and legally, the two points are mutually distinct. In this light, it is not surprising
that Robins made no mention of remoteness, despite the fact that the court of
95
appeals used remoteness to rationalize previous cases which denied recovery
and even though the defendant argued before the Supreme Court that the

allowing one railroad company to use a bridge did not create a property interest upon which the
railroad company could base its claim for economic loss); Plaza Marine, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 814 F.
Supp. 334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that there was no property interest where the plaintiff used
a terminal facility to sell diesel fuel where the plaintiff did not own the damaged dock). But see Holt
Hauling & Warehousing Systems, Inc. v. M/V Ming Joy, 614 F. Supp. 890, 899 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(holding that the proper test is a showing that a plaintiff's interest, whether founded upon contract
or otherwise, displays sufficient "'incidents of ownership' such that the plaintiff is well-positioned
to protect the property by discovering damage, identifying those responsible, and bringing suit
without the danger of "never-ending economic ripple effects and duplicative litigation"). While
approving the analysis in cases such as Louisville & Nashville R.R. and emphasizing that the
plaintiff must have sufficient sole "control and possession" of the damaged item, the court in Holt
Hauling proposed a "functional" rather than a "formal" ownership interest requirement. Id. at 89899. The functional approach is endorsed by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: EcON. TORTS
AND RELATED WRONGS § 19 cmt. b, at 231 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006).
93. This is noted in the leading majority decisions. See Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 51-52. See
also the forceful dissent of Winter, J. in Venore Transp. Co. v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 711-12
(4th Cir. 1978). For the same reason, given the requisite protected interest, all resulting foreseeable
financial loss is recoverable without distinction, contrary to the suggestions of Gordley and R. Perry
noted in supra note 58.
94. This proposition is recognized by the vast majority of decisions. See, e.g., Louisiana ex
rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Thus Robins was a pragmatic
limitation imposed by the Court upon the tort doctrine of foreseeability."); Barber Lines, 764 F.2d
at 50 ("[C]ontrolling case law denies that a plaintiff can recover damages for negligently caused
financial harm, even when foreseeable .... ").
95. Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1926), rev'd, 275 U.S. 303.
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plaintiffs' claim should fail for this very reason. 96 It would also seem to follow
that where a plaintiff does have the requisite right as against the defendant, and
the plaintiff can satisfy the ordinary standard of forseeability, there should be

recovery, regardless of how many other plaintiffs with divergent financial claims
are similarly positioned to succeed. 97 As it stands, Robins provides no point of

entry for the pragmatic objection. In itself, the number of claims is irrelevant.
Fifth, while the plaintiffs' loss in Robins did not result from physical damage
to the plaintiffs' possessory or proprietary interest, the decision does not require
that recoverable financial loss be consequential upon actual physical damage to
the protected interest. This aspect of the rule against recovery must be clarified

because there are some relatively recent majority decisions (as well as minority
decisions) that assert the contrary. 98 What Robins requires is simply that the

plaintiff's financial loss results from an impairment of the plaintiffs property or
possessory right. Actual physical damage is merely one way in which a right can
be injured-it has no further significance and is certainly not a per se
requirement. Therefore, where a right is impaired, even absent actual physical

damage, Robins does not bar recovery for resulting financial loss. Current
majority interpretations and applications of the economic loss rule that make the
absence of actual physical damage fatal to recovery overreach, while failing to
recognize and protect the plaintiff s rights.
By way of illustration, consider the following two sets of facts drawn from

well-known cases-the first from a leading majority decision, and the second
from a leading minority judgment. In both scenarios, there has not been any
actual physical injury to the item with respect to which financial loss is claimed.
Nevertheless, Robins, correctly understood, not only rejects the majority analysis

leading to nonrecovery but also supports the minority conclusion imposing
liability.
In the first scenario, 99 while the defendant's (or a third party's) vessel is
discharging cargo at the plaintiff's marine terminal, a crack in the vessel's deck
and hull is discovered. The Coast Guard orders the vessel to remain at berth until
the problem is resolved. The crack, we suppose, is attributable to the defendant's

96. See Robins, 275 U.S. at 305-06. When Justice Holmes wrote that "a tort to the person or
property of one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured
person was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong," Robins, 275 U.S. at
309 (emphasis added), the reference to the absence of knowledge was included merely to show that
the conduct could not possibly be an intentional interference with contractual relations, for which
there can be liability. Exceptionally, certain decisions incorrectly see this reference as negating
foreseeability, which they take as the reason for the denial of recovery in Robins. See, e.g., Aikens
v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 501 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("The reason a plaintiff cannot
recover stems from the fact that the negligent actor has no knowledge of the contract or prospective
relation and thus has no reason to foresee any harm to the plaintiff's interest.").
97. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
98. See sources cited supra note 59.
99. These facts are modeled after Getty Refining & Mktg. Co. v. MT FADI B, 766 F.2d 829,
830 (3d Cir. 1985).
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negligence, and the response by the Coast Guard is reasonably foreseeable.
During the period of enforced delay, the plaintiff is not able to use its pier as
planned, despite the fact that nothing prevents other vessels from approaching
the pier by water. Because the plaintiff cannot give access to other ships that are
scheduled and able to dock, the plaintiff suffers financial loss in the form of
demurrage payments contractually owed to these ships in such circumstances.
Yet, there has been no actual physical damage to the plaintiff's pier. Supposing
these financial losses are the reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant's
negligence, are they barred by Robins?
The plaintiffs inability to give third parties access to its pier interferes with
the plaintiff s capacity to use its own property. This impairment of its capacity to
use its own property is, we have supposed, the foreseeable result of the
defendant's negligence. The gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint should be
made clear: the plaintiff asks that the defendant leave the plaintiffs property (the
pier) alone, not that the defendant refrain from impairing something else that the
plaintiff neither owns nor possesses but which the plaintiff wishes to use in
conjunction with its own property. l° The plaintiffs claim is that it has lost
profits, not because vessels are prevented from reaching the plaintiff's otherwise
functional facility (because, say, the defendant negligently has sunk a barge near
the pier), but because the defendant has affected the facility itself, making it
impossible for the plaintiff to use it at all.'' All that the plaintiff is asserting is
its right in rem as against the defendant. 1°2 But this is exactly what Robins
requires.
That this interference with use arises through the vessel's continued
occupation of the pier at the order of the public authorities rather than as a result
of direct physical damage to the pier is not determinative: these represent merely
two different ways in which the defendant's negligence can interfere with the
plaintiff's right. Indeed, the vessel's continued physical occupation of the pier is
significant only because it constitutes negligent conduct that foreseeably triggers
the order to shut down the pier. This same consequence, with resulting liability,
might very well be produced by conduct not entailing any physical contact with
the pier. Moreover, the fact that the plaintiff's financial loss arises because of its
contractual relations with third parties is just the manner in which the lost use of

100. Cf. Vicksburg Towing Co. v. Miss. Marine Transp. Co., 609 F.2d 176, 177 (5th Cir.
1980) (distinguishing between plaintiffs who own damaged property and plaintiffs who do not own
the damaged property).
101. This contrast is from Reserve Mooring, Inc. v. Am. Commercial Barge Lines, No 991433, 1999 WL 1080317, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 1999), rev'd 251 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2001).
102. With reference to similar facts, a United States District Court emphasized that the
plaintiff "owned the offshore oil platform, and its ownership interest includes the right to use that
platform. The interference with that right underlies its claim for economic loss ....
[T]he key
consideration here is the character of [the plaintiff's] interest and not whether the platform sustained
any physical damage." Secko Energy, Inc. v. MN Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1009, 1012
(E.D. La. 1993).
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its own property materializes.

Loss

03

Such loss would be equivalent to the owner of

the damaged vessel in Robins suffering a financial loss by having to indemnify
the plaintiff time-charterer because of the contract between them. As a matter of
precedent, there is no doubt that even the strictest view would not preclude

recovery of this loss.04 In the first scenario, recovery should not be barred as a
matter of principle either, despite the absence of actual physical damage to the
pier. 105

In the second scenario,' the plaintiff airline suffers financial loss when it is
forced to evacuate its offices in the wake of a tank car accident that occurs at the
defendant's nearby railroad yard because of the defendant's negligence. The

evacuation is ordered by the municipal authorities because the vicinity
surrounding the accident would be threatened by fire if the damaged tank car

explodes. While no explosion or physical damage to plaintiff's premises occurs,
not only are the plaintiff's employees required to leave the premises, but in

addition they cannot return to the offices for a period of time. As a result, the
plaintiff suffers business interruption losses including lost bookings, wasted
wages, and other fixed operating expenses that have to be paid during the period

of closure. Once again, does Robins preclude recovery for these losses if they are
reasonably foreseeable?
The second set of facts requires a more nuanced analysis. Financial losses
incurred by the plaintiff simply because the plaintiffs employees are forced to

leave (for example, that day's lost bookings and wasted wages) must be
distinguished from losses resulting from the employees not being able to return

to work because access to the offices, for instance, a public road, is not available.
Robins would allow recovery for the first category of losses but not for the

103. The majority opinion in Getty was therefore incorrect when it held that the plaintiff's
claim, on facts similar to those presented in this hypothetical, "falls squarely within the prohibition
of Robins" because the loss was incurred "solely because of its contractual relations with the
various vessels" and not "by reason of its property right in the dock itself." Getty, 766 F.2d at 834.
This same criticism applies to the majority view decisions cited supra note 59. By contrast, the
dissenting opinion in Getty got it exactly right when it said that "[t]he tortious activity complained
of is not the interference with contracts but the blockage of the dock." Getty, 766 F.2d at 841
(Mansmann, J., dissenting)..
104. See Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419, 420 (Ga. 1903).
105. See, e.g., In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F. Supp. 697, 699, 705 (D.N.J. 1995)
(adopting the minority view and holding that according to New Jersey common law the plaintiff,
who was the owner and operator of a berth, could recover damages for interruption of its business
and interference with its contractual relations with third parties resulting from the defendant's
vessel's unexpected and lengthy stay at the berth for repairs made necessary by defendant's
negligence). In Nautilus, the defendant's negligence caused no physical damage to the berth. Id. at
699. The Court relied on People Express to justify recovery in these circumstances because in its
view, Robins and its progeny stood against recovery. Id. at 704-05 (citing People Express Airlines,
Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 113 (N.J. 1985)). The analysis proposed in this Article
supports this conclusion in principle but does so squarely within the parameters of Robins as
explained herein.
106. This hypothetical is modeled after the leading minority decision found in People Express
Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 108-09 (N.J. 1985).
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second. 0 7 Only the first category of loss arises from the defendant's interference
with the plaintiffs rightful, exclusive use of its own property. °8 By contrast, in
the second category, where the plaintiffs financial losses arise because its
employees are not able to use a public road to return to plaintiffs premises, the
plaintiffs claim for such losses entails that the defendant should indemnify the

plaintiff for interfering with the latter's use of something-the public road to its
offices-which the plaintiff neither owns nor possesses. For the purposes of9
negligence, the plaintiff has no claim to such use as against the defendant.'
0
This is precisely the factor that brings the Robins's exclusion into play."
B.

The Alternative Tests of Liability

The actual reasoning in Robins does more than settle current questions
regarding the content and reach of the economic loss rule. It also provides a clear
and definitive answer to the main alternative tests for the recovery of economic
loss proposed by minority courts and certain foreign common law jurisdictionssomething which the current majority interpretation is unable to do. Only if the
Robins principle provides such an answer can the principle hold its own and be
complete in its own terms. For purposes of this discussion, I have divided the

alternative tests into two categories which, briefly summarized, are as follows.
In the first minority approach,' the traditional standard of proximity is
sharpened and intensified by requiring either that the plaintiff be a member of an

107. People Express, 495 A.2d at 113.
108. The Supreme Court of Wyoming said of People Express: "Recovery permitted here is for
loss of the injured party's property or loss of use of its property needed in the conduct of business."
Champion Well Serv., Inc. v. NL Indus., 769 P.2d 382, 384 (Wyo. 1989). Decisions to grant
recovery for economic losses arising from property being made unusable because of contamination
caused by defendant's negligence may also be justified on this basis. See Pennsylvania v. Gen. Pub.
Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1983); Syracuse Cablesystems, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk
Power Corp., 578 N.Y.S.2d 770, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
109. As a matter of negligence law, following Robins, there is no difference between this sort
of claim and claims for financial loss arising from bridge closures which are standardly denied. See
cases cited supra note 16. Denial of access to a right of way may, of course, be actionable in public
nuisance which is, I argue, a different and distinct legal basis. See infra notes 120-22 and
accompanying text.
110. This suggested contrast between the two kinds of claims in the second scenario was the
basis of a 1970 German decision which factually is strictly analogous to People Express. See JAMES
GORDLEY & ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF PRIVATE LAW: READINGS, CASES, MATERIALS 317 (2006) (citing People Express, 495 A.2d
107; BGHZ, 55, 153). In a New York case, the New York Court of Appeals denied recovery in
negligence to the plaintiffs, a group of various businesses, who brought actions for lost revenues
when shoppers were unable to gain access to their stores as a result of street closures following
construction collapses for which the defendants were allegedly responsible. 532 Madison Ave.
Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1099, 1103 (N.Y. 2001). While the
court based its conclusion on the bright line approach to the economic loss rule, id. at 1103,
nonrecovery is also consistent with the analysis proposed in this Article.
111. The leading minority decision taking this approach is People Express, 495 A.2d 107.
Additional decisions also serve as decisions also serve as examples of this first approach. See, e.g.,
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identifiable or particularly foreseeable class or, alternatively, that the damage
sustained be particular and special-different in kind and degree from the
economic loss suffered by the general public as a result of the accident. The aim
of this minority approach is to ensure that the nexus between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's loss is sufficiently distinct and close so that if liability
is imposed, it will be circumscribed and not the open-ended or expansive
liability that concerns the pragmatic objection. There is no reason to deny
recovery.
In the second alternative approach, approved by some minority courts"12 and
endorsed by leading commentators," 3 the focus is on the character of the
plaintiff's interest. According to this approach, recovery should be possible when
the plaintiff's interest in the damaged item is the very sort of interest that would

be protected if sued upon by the owner. For example, a vendor and plaintiff
purchaser may agree that, while the goods are being transported to the purchaser,
the vendor will retain title in the goods but will transfer the risk of loss to the

Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1046-53 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting) ("The limitation imposed by 'particular' damages, together with refined notions of
proximate cause and forseeability, provides a workable scheme of liability that is in step with the
rest of tort law, compensates innocent plaintiffs, and imposes the costs of harm on those who caused
it."); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he chief element in
determining whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of the
risk."); Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 360-61 (Alaska 1987) (citing People
Express, 495 A.2d at 115-16, 118) ("[T]he extent of liability and degree of foreseeability stand in
direct proportion to one another. The more particular the foreseeability that economic loss will be
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of defendant's negligence, the more just it is that liability be
imposed and recovery allowed."); Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576, 589-90) (W. Va. 2000)
(concluding that a plaintiff who sustains purely economic loss may not recover unless there is a
special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant that gives rise to a duty, and suggesting
such special relationship can be proven "through evidence of foreseeability of the nature of the harm
to be suffered by the particular plaintiff or an identifiable class"); Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v.
The Dredge "Willemstad", (1976) 136 C.L.R. 529 (Austl.) (suggesting a relationship of proximity
between tortuous act and resultant detriment that gives rise to a duty of care as a criterion for
limiting recovery for purely economic loss); Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co., [1992]
91 D.L.R. (4th) 289 (Can.) (finding that proximity and the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant-i.e. contractual nexus-may give rise to a duty to the "known plaintiff").
112. See Amoco Transp. Co. v. S/S Mason Lykes, 768 F.2d 659, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1985);
Venore Transp. Co. v. MN Struma, 583 F.2d 708, 709-10 (4th Cir. 1978); Flint v. Robins Dry
Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 3, 5 (2d Cir. 1926), rev'd, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Pruitt v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 979 (E.D. Va. 1981) (citing Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 570). These are the
most important American decisions. Among English judges, Goff L.J. (as he then was) took this
approach in Leigh & Sillivan Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1985] Q.B. 350, 399 (Eng. C.A.).
113. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 165; Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory
Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 718-21 (2006) [hereinafter Dobbs, Economic Loss
Claims]; Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV.
335, 339, 372-73 (1980); Fleming, supra note 31, at 30; James, supra note 4, at 56-57. Ronen Perry
argues that economic analysis justifies recovery for what he calls "transferred property damage."
Perry, RelationalEconomic Loss, supra note 19, at 784-85. This sort of loss corresponds to the kind
of loss discussed here.
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purchaser.11 4 If a third party damages the goods en route, then the purchaser will
bear the loss. Similarly, a charter party may transfer the risk of loss of use of the
vessel from the owner to the plaintiff time-charterer, so that the time-charterer,
not the owner, bears the financial burden of impaired use." 5 In such
circumstances of "transferred loss,,16 because the plaintiff s loss is with respect
to a conventional or ordinary item of recovery," 7 liability will normally not be
open-ended or excessive. The pragmatic objection does not apply. Denying
recovery to plaintiffs in these situations will result in ordinarily protected items
being unprotected and defendants not having to shoulder the usual consequences
of their negligence. This, it is argued, is both unnecessary and unfair.
The alternative approaches are proposed as superior to the economic loss
rule in fulfilling the traditional purposes of negligence law. These alternatives
claim to ensure that generally recognized principles of negligence are not
compromised or sacrificed in circumstances where the pragmatic objection does
not apply. Since, it is contended, allowing recovery in the circumstances
specified under these alternative approaches will not result in open-ended
liability, requiring the plaintiff to have a property or possessory interest in the
damaged item is no longer necessary. And because these alternatives rely on a
definite and refined balancing of the very sorts of considerations relevant to the
pragmatic objection as well, the latter appears incapable of resisting this revision
of the economic loss rule. How do these alternative approaches look in light of
Robins? To provide an answer that does justice to these alternatives, I want to
consider them in a little more detail.
Beginning with the first minority approach, one criterion proposed to ensure
that pure economic loss is special and circumscribed even though it does not
result from interference with the plaintiff's property or possession is a
requirement that the plaintiff's financial loss arises from the very same
negligence that also causes-or at least threatens to cause-injury to the
plaintiffs person or property. 18 For example, the defendant negligently cuts

114. See Leigh & Sillivan, [1985] Q.B. at 382; Margarine Union v. Cambay Prince Steamship
Co., (1967) 3 All E.R. 775, 777-78 (Q.B.).
115. See Venore Transp., 583 F.2d at 709.
116. This is the term most used by courts and scholars. See Venore Transp., 583 F.2d at 710711; Canadian Nat'l Ry., [1992] 91 D.L.R. at 326-32 (LaForest, J.). See also the instructive
elucidation of this principle in Leigh & Sillivan [1985] Q.B. at 399 (Goff, L.J.). For use by scholars,
see citations in supra note 113. Throughout this Article, I use the term to cover situations in which
the incidents or interests of ownership-for example, use or value-in a damaged item have been
allocated or divided between two or more persons, where typically one party is and remains an
owner and another is not an owner in a strict sense. For a somewhat different presentation of the
transferred loss principle, see Dobbs, Economic Loss Claims, supra note 113, at 718-20.
117. This is how the loss is characterized in Venore Transp., 583 F.2d at 710. See also James,
supra note 4, at 56 (describing a transferred loss as an "ordinary item of damage").
118. Several judicial opinions endorse this approach. See Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co. v.
Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 198, 207 (5th Cir. 1995) (Benavides, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v. FMC Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1976); Seaway Hotels Ltd. v. Gragg (Can.) Ltd., [1959] 21 D.L.R.2d 264 (Can.). Although it
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electrical cables owned by the municipality which supplies power to the

plaintiffs hotel, cutting off power. This damages the cooling mechanisms of the
plaintiffs refrigerators, causing physical loss, and also blacks out the plaintiff's
premises, forcing the plaintiff temporarily to close its dining hall, with resulting
financial loss. According to the proposed criterion, it is enough that the financial
loss flows from negligent conduct that also causes damage to the plaintiffs
property, even though the financial loss does not result from that damage. In this

way, the actionable financial consequences of negligence are limited, thus
meeting the pragmatic objection.
However, the problem with this approach is that on the above facts the
financial loss does not flow from an actual or threatened interference with the
plaintiff's rights in anything. The financial loss results from the loss of electricity
that is supplied by city cables, with respect to which the hotel owner plaintiff has
no right of use as against the defendant. The only right that the plaintiff has to
the supply of power is a contractual right as against the city. The fact that one
loss (here, the physical loss) does result from injury to an interest (its
refrigerators) in which the plaintiff has the requisite right does not establish that
some other independent loss also arises from a breach of such a right. Each item
of loss must be shown to result from interference with a right which the plaintiff
has as against the defendant. The point is that conduct may be negligent, in the
sense of being careless, and may cause "loss" (damnum) without affecting
something that comes under the plaintiff's rights as against the defendant
(injuria). A requirement that the financial loss results from negligent conduct
that also causes physical loss to the plaintiff's person or property may serve as a
limiting device that cuts off the spectre of open-ended liability or the
multiplication of suits-satisfying the pragmatic objection-but it does nothing
to link the financial loss to something in which the plaintiff has the necessary
119
protected interest. It cannot possibly satisfy Robins.

was subsequently reversed, the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division endorsed the
approach taken by Dunlop Tire. See 5th Ave. Chocolatierre, Ltd. v. 540 Acquisition Co., 712
N.Y.S.2d 8, 12 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (citing Dunlop Tire, 385 N.Y.S.2d 971), rev'd sub nom. 532
Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097 (N.Y. 2001). A good
discussion of the law is found in Atiyah, supra note 19, at 253-54. For scholarly support of this
approach, see Bishop & Sutton, Efficiency and Justice, supra note 19, at 357; Rizzo, supra note 19,
at 303.
119. This is recognized by the leading majority-view decisions. See Am. River Transp. Co. v.
Kavo Kaliakra SS, 206 F.3d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v.
Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 307-09 (1927)); Corpus Christi, 71 F.3d at 203 (quoting Louisiana ex rel.
Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1985)); Gas Natural SDG S.A. v. United
States, No. 04 Civ. 8370(DAB), 2007 WL 959259, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2007) (quoting
Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1022). Some courts reject this minority approach on the basis that it will
"largely eviscerate" the economic loss rule as a limitation of liability and as a bright line rule. See,
e.g., In re Oriental Republic of Uru., 821 F. Supp. 934, 940 n.3 (D. Del. 1993) ("[T]he "bright line"
rule contemplated by Robins and FADI B would be substantially blurred under this interpretation.
The pragmatic limitation imposed by the Robins rule as well as the rule's utility, ease of application
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A more serious challenge is posed by those decisions that propose a more
narrowly defined conception of proximity and directness in an effort to confine
liability and to meet the pragmatic objection. Here again, the point of these
formulations is to demonstrate that the plaintiffs financial loss is different in
kind from the financial losses that may be ordinarily and foreseeably sustained
by the public in general following damage to some item or resource that they
neither own nor possess. The contention is that because the pragmatic objection
no longer applies, there is no reason in fairness or justice to deny recovery. To
establish the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's financial loss, courts consider,
among other things, whether the plaintiffs loss is temporally and physically
close to the accident; whether the plaintiffs presence in the zone of danger is
fortuitous or predictable; whether the defendant has a reasonable opportunity to
ascertain the more specific identity and nature of the plaintiffs interest in the
damaged thing and to foresee that its negligence can directly affect those
interests, causing financial loss; whether the plaintiffs interest in the use of the
damaged item-owned and possessed by a third party-is primary and direct or
merely incidental and casual; whether the item, if damaged, would be productive
of economic loss to those who rely directly on its use; and whether the plaintiff's
loss can be shown to be special and particular in a way that would satisfy the
requirements of public nuisance. 120 These various considerations allow courts 121
to
establish what Jane Stapleton has called "normatively justifiable" boundaries
that distinguish those who can recover relational economic loss without running
afoul of the legitimate concerns of the pragmatic objection. Or so it is argued.
But are these boundaries normatively justifiable in the sense of satisfying
Robins's requirement that the plaintiffs financial interest in the use of the
damaged item must be founded upon some rightful claim as against the
defendant? The considerations used to establish the distinctiveness of the
plaintiff's loss may certainly show that a plaintiffs loss or identity is
"particularly" foreseeable or "specifically" ascertainable. And since the
foreseeability and ascertainableness of the loss as well as of the class of plaintiffs
are definite prerequisites of liability in negligence, factors which establish
particular foreseeability are normatively relevant at least insofar as they relate to
these requirements. Nevertheless, forseeability is only one of the necessary
conditions for liability. Robins held that it is also essential that the plaintiff has a
right exclusive as against the defendant. This is a distinct and independent
requirement. Such a right is necessary to establish a normatively justified basis
for singling out a plaintiff for recovery; "distinct," "special," or "particularly
foreseeable" loss is no substitute. Efforts to specify forseeability and directness
do not satisfy the requirement in Robins-not because they are incoherent or

and predictability all would be undermined if Sun's interpretation of the rule were adopted here.").
However, for reasons discussed in the text, this criticism cannot be definitive.
120. See cases cited supra note 111.
121. Stapleton, Comparative Economic Loss, supra note 19, at 538, 544.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss4/3

32

2009]

Benson: The Problem with Pure Economic Loss
THE PROBLEM WITH PURE ECONOMIC Loss

intrinsically unreasonable but simply because foreseeability and directness do

not, in themselves, assure the existence of the requisite right. 122 They are
normatively irrelevant for this purpose.
The same conclusion applies to the different formulations under the second
category of alternative tests, namely, transferred loss. Here, because the Second
Circuit in Robins allowed recovery on this very basis, 123 the incompatibility with

the Supreme Court's reason for denying recovery is transparent. According to
the Supreme Court, it is not, and cannot be, an argument for allowing recovery
that the plaintiffs loss is the sort of loss that might be sustained by a different

122. This is true of attempts, usually unsuccessful, to base claims in negligence on an analysis
drawn from private actions in public nuisance. In suits for pure economic loss, plaintiffs frequently
frame their claims alternatively in negligence and public nuisance. See, e.g., Testbank, 752 F.2d at
1030-31 (addressing the plaintiff's public nuisance claim). This is of course perfectly legitimate, so
long as the difference between these two types of claims is kept clearly in view. My concern here is
solely with negligence and my contention is that the public nuisance distinction between particular
and general damage is not sufficient by itself to justify a plaintiff's claim in negligence for its
economic loss.
To be actionable in negligence, the damage must be to an interest that comes under the
plaintiff's individual right as against the defendant. By contrast, the gravamen of the public
nuisance action is for interference-usually, but not always, intentional-with some facility,
conduit, or asset that people use and enjoy through the exercise of a right common to the general
public. As Prosser explains, public nuisance is the invasion of an interest-a type of harm or
damage-rather than a certain kind of conduct or condition; it requires that there be interference
with the exercise of a public, not individual, right. William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public
Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1002-04 (1966). While activities that interfere with the private rights
of individuals may also affect their public rights, or vice versa, this is not necessarily or always the
case, and it certainly does not dissolve the juridical or conceptual difference between these two
kinds of interests. Id.
Each type of action must therefore be established and accounted for on its own terms, and one
cannot move directly from one to the other. Indeed, the public nuisance requirement of special loss
expresses an additional limitation that is in principle not only irrelevant, but also wholly
inappropriate in negligence where everyone who has sustained wrongful interference with his or her
private right (e.g. property interest) has standing to sue for her foreseeable loss, whether the loss is
identical or different in kind from that sustained by others. For useful recent judicial discussions,
see Neb. Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-DesMoines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124, 129-30 (Iowa 1984),
and Stop & Shop Cos. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368, 371-74 (Mass. 1983). Discussions of the
relevance of public nuisance to negligence actions often ignore the different bases of these two
kinds of liability. This is true, for example, of Stapleton. See Stapleton, Comparative Economic
Loss, supra note 19, at 567-71. Similarly, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECONOMIC TORTS
AND RELATED WRONGS moves directly from a nuisance analysis to a claim in negligence for solely
pecuniary loss resulting from negligent damage to or obstruction of public property or a public
resource, so long as recovery does not raise the concern of indeterminate liability. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 20, at 241 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006).
This leads the Restatement to support claims such as those of businesses that rely on a publicly
owned bridge for access and exit that lose profits when customers are no longer able to reach their
premises as a result of bridge closure arising from a defendant's negligence. See id. cmt. c, illus. 4.
Such a claim is one for economic loss that Robins squarely bars. The fact that the bridge is "public"
has no further significance beyond the fact that it is not owned by the claimants, who therefore do
not have the required protected interest for a negligence claim.
123. Flint v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 13 F.2d 3, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1926), rev'd, 275 U.S.
303 (1927).
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party who happens to have the requisite right as against the defendant. The fact
that one person-the plaintiff-suffers a loss which in different circumstances
might have been borne by another who has a property or possessory interest in
the damaged item does not establish that the plaintiff has the necessary right.
Plaintiffs must sue for their own rights, not as the vicarious beneficiaries of
others' rights. Robins therefore stands against the idea of a conventional or
ordinary item of recovery, divorced from the appropriate legal relation between
the parties. Apart from this relation, the meaning of "conventional" or "ordinary"
is purely factual and statistical. It has no legal significance.
More generally, the potential number of persons who will be entitled to sue
if the plaintiff succeeds or fails under Robins must be, in itself, wholly irrelevant
according to the decision's reasoning. The only thing that matters is whether a
plaintiff bases his or her claim on a relation of rights as between the parties.
Thus, in circumstances of transferred loss, the fact that only one person (the
plaintiff) and not others (the owner) will recover if the plaintiff's claim is
accepted does not in the least strengthen the plaintiffs claim, even though this
may avoid open-ended liability. On the other hand, Robins not only permits, but
indeed requires, recovery by two or more plaintiffs of their financial losses with
respect to the same item if each of them has the requisite right exclusive as
against the defendant. 124 And just as it is possible for there to be more than one
valid claim, it is possible that there might be no valid claim. The fact that
nonrecovery by the plaintiff (who, we suppose, does not have the required right)
may result in the negligent defendant not having to indemnify anyone for the
consequences of his or her interference is not necessarily problematic. Here, it
simply means that, in the assumed circumstances, the defendant's conduct has
not injured anyone's rights and has caused no wrongful loss. Consequently, the
defendant is not obliged to compensate anyone. According to the analysis of
negligence in Robins, this result is not capricious, nor does it represent a lacuna
in the law (as some have contended). 125 To the contrary, this result is required.
C. Some "Exceptions" to Robins Explained

There is wide agreement that, in a number of well-defined situations, there
can be recovery in negligence for pure economic loss. This is fully accepted by
the same courts that adhere to Robins. 26 Usually, they present these recovery
situations as "exceptions" to an economic loss rule which, they assume, entails a
general exclusion of liability for pure economic loss in light of the pragmatic

124. So for example, both the owner and the bareboat charterer of a vessel damaged by
defendant may recover their respective foreseeable economic losses, including lost profits, resulting
from impairment of their distinct uses of the vessel. See Rogers Terminal & Shipping Corp. v. Int'l
Grain Transfer, Inc., 672 F.2d 464,466 (5th Cir. 1982).
125. See Fleming, supra note 31, at 30.
126. See, e.g., Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 57 (noting a general principle against liability for
negligently caused financial harm but recognizing that courts have created exceptions).
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objection.t17 This standard view seems inevitable so long as Robins is taken to
represent a general exclusion of liability for causing pure economic loss. 128 But
the upshot of the previous discussion is that this view of the decision cannot be
correct. If, as I have argued, the reason for nonrecovery is the plaintiff's failure
to found its claim on the defendant's interference with its exclusive right, the
very basis for denial sets definite qualitative limits to the exclusion of liability,
beyond which it does not and cannot reach. Robins will thus be fully consistent
with recovery in other situations of pure economic loss where the requirement of
an exclusive right is satisfied. No situation need be viewed as an exception to the
other. To illustrate, I will now briefly consider two of the more important and
so-called "unavoidable" economic loss and reliancesettled recovery situations:
29
based economic loss.

127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 19, at 249 (Robins lays down "the general proposition
that claims for pure economic loss are not recoverable in tort" (emphasis added)).
129. The list is, of course, not complete. Two other exceptions listed in Barber Lines are
recovery in negligence for general average contribution losses and recovery for economic loss
resulting from intentional interference with contractual relations. I discuss the first in P. Benson,
The Basis and Limits of Tort Recovery for General Average Contribution Economic Loss, 16 Torts
L.J. 1 (2008), and the second in Benson, supra note 5, at 455-57.
Whereas it is possible to show that these two exceptions are fully compatible with Robins, this
is not the case with a third-the well-known "commercial fishermen exception." The latter
exception has been actually applied or at least recognized in multiple cases. See Yarmouth Sea
Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d at 398-99 (4th Cir. 1996); In re Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach
Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 625 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994); Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1027 n.10 (quoting Union Oil
Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570-71 (9th Cir. 1974)); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Dona Maru, 764
F.2d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 1985); Miller Indus. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 819-20 (1lth
Cir. 1984) (citing Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 567; Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178, 182-83 (9th Cir.
1953); Casado v. Schooner Pilgrim, Inc. 171 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D. Mass. 1959)); Union Oil, 501 F.2d
at 569-70; Carbone, 209 F.2d at 182-83; Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D.
Va. 1981).
The courts that recognize this claim do not premise it on the plaintiffs having a proprietary or
possessory right in the damaged property (fish for example). To the contrary, their view (when
expressed) is that there is no such right. See Pruitt,523 F. Supp. at 976 n.3. But this makes recovery
directly incompatible with Robins. See Henderson v. Arundel Corp., 262 F. Supp. 152, 159-60 (D.
Md. 1966) (quoting Casado, 171 F. Supp. at 80). The fact that the use made by commercial
fishermen may be "more direct" or "immediate" than that of restaurant owners who depend on the
fishermen's harvest is legally irrelevant because it does nothing at all to establish the requisite
exclusive right-whether possessory, proprietary, or contractual-in the resource that is no longer
available. Measured against this criterion, all these uses are legally indistinguishable. It is therefore
not surprising that courts candidly confess that line drawing on a principled basis is difficult, if not
impossible: "The Court thus finds itself with a perceived need to limit liability, without any
articulable reason for excluding any particular set of plaintiffs." Pruitt, 523 F. Supp. at 980.
Nonrecovery has been justified on economic grounds. See Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra
note 19, at 786. But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: EcON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS §
20 cmt. c (supporting recovery for economic loss by claimants (not only commercial fishermen)
who are "primary users of a [public] natural resource" so long as their loss is reasonably certain and
recovery does not impose indeterminate liability). The fact that a resource is "public," however,
does not give the claimant the individual exclusive right required by Robins.
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"Unavoidable" Pure Economic Loss

In typical circumstances of what I shall call "unavoidable"'' 30 economic loss,
the plaintiff is using something that belongs to a third party in such a way that if
it is damaged, then the plaintiffs own person or property will be endangered.
The defendant damages the third party's property and the plaintiff unavoidably
suffers financial loss as a result of the plaintiff attempting to avoid or mitigate
the threatened danger to his or her interests. Because such loss need not be
consequential upon actual damage to plaintiff's person or property, it is pure
economic loss. Since the financial loss apparently results from damage to a third
party's property, it seems to be relational economic loss. Despite the economic
loss rule, however, there is accepted case law which holds that such pure
economic loss, when reasonably foreseeable, is recoverable.' 31 To understand the
basis of these decisions and their relation to Robins, it will be helpful, as a first
step, to begin with a situation involving not financial but rather physical loss. By
way of illustration, consider the important line of cases associated with the early
and generally followed decision in Newlin v. New England Tel. & Tel.

Company, 132 which is usually seen as an exception to the economic loss rule.
In Newlin, the plaintiff was in the business of growing and selling
mushrooms which were cultivated in cellars requiring a uniform temperature.
The apparatus used by the plaintiff to maintain this uniform temperature was
powered by electricity and the electricity was, in turn, supplied by a third-party
power company under contract with the plaintiff. The defendant carelessly
damaged the third party's power line, thereby cutting off the supply of electricity
to the plaintiff. As a result of the power cut-off, the plaintiffs apparatus was
disabled, causing the temperature to rise and destroying the mushroom crop. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that the plaintiffs claim
against the defendant in negligence for the loss of the crop was actionable,
despite the fact that the plaintiff "derived his right to the use of the electric
current from others." 133

130. The phrase is taken from Lord Oliver's speech in the leading House of Lords decision in
Murphy v. Brentwood Dist. Council, [19911 1 A.C. 398, 486-87 (Eng. H.L.) (Oliver, L.), where he
contrasted an expenditure incurred by the plaintiff to prevent or mitigate "an otherwise inevitable
injury" with financial losses barred by the economic loss rule. I examine unavoidable economic loss
with reference to Murphy in Benson, supra note 5, at 437-44, and in relation to recovery for general
average contribution losses in Benson, supra note 129. The following discussion draws on this latter
article.
131. The leading case is Corpus Christi Oil & Gas Co. v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp., 71 F.3d
198, 207 (5th Cir. 1995). See discussion infra notes 136-45 and accompanying text. For English
and Commonwealth cases, see cases cited infra note 144.
132. 54 N.E.2d 929 (1944). The Newlin fact pattern appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766C cmt. b illus. 5, where it endorses the granting of recovery. Although a case of
physical loss, Newlin is one of the exceptions to the economic loss doctrine that is listed in Barber
Lines, 764 F.2d at 57.
133. Newlin, 54 N.E.2d at 931.
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This conclusion may be justified within certain parameters.' 34 The plaintiff
is using the power supply and, in the process of using it, the power cut-off results
in an uncontrolled increase in temperature which destroys the crop before the
plaintiff can take corrective measures. The defendant may be viewed as having

carelessly affected the property of a third party in a way that endangers the
plaintiffs own property. If it is reasonable to so characterize the incident in
Newlin, the gist of the plaintiffs claim is not that the plaintiff has, as against the
defendant, a right to the continued availability of the electricity, which is not the
case, but rather that, as a result of the defendant's failure to take care, the

plaintiff s use of the electricity has become a source of danger to plaintiff s crop,
which does come under plaintiff's (property) rights. On this analysis, the fact
that the crop is destroyed as a result of the mere stoppage of the temperature
control mechanism rather than, say, by its exploding, is just the particular
manner in which the danger to plaintiffs crop materializes. And while the

plaintiffs loss is "physical," its recoverability does not depend upon this but
rather upon the fact that the plaintiffs complaint with respect to this loss rests
only upon an interest in excluding the defendant from plaintiff's property (the
mushroom crop) rather than a positive interest in enjoying the continued
availability of the electricity, to which the plaintiff has no right except as against
the third party. According to this analysis, the plaintiff's claim is simply for
compensation for injury to property, even though the plaintiff sustained this loss
while using someone else's power to which the plaintiff had no right
(possessory, proprietary, or contractual) as against the defendant.
The argument for recovering unavoidable pure economic loss draws upon
the foregoing analysis and takes it one step further.

35

By way of illustration,

there is the important decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Corpus

134. A similar result was reached in the widely discussed English case, Spartan Steel & Alloys
Ltd. v. Martin & Co., [1972] 3 All E.R. 557 (C.A.) (Eng.). Other cases that involve injury to
property or person in a manner similar to that in Newlin include Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v.
C.F. Bean Corp., 772 F.2d. 1217 (5th Cir. 1985) (involving defendant's dredger that ruptured a
natural gas pipeline which supplied gas to plaintiffs plant, resulting in an interruption in the supply
of gas and causing extensive damage to physical equipment at the plant), and Muirhead v. Industrial
Tank Specialties Ltd., (1986) 1 Q.B. 507 (C.A.) (Eng.) (involving death of lobsters in tanks because
of pump motor failure due to negligence of motor manufacturer; owner of lobsters sued for loss of
lobsters and resulting economic losses including lost profits).
135. While the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: EcONOMIC TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS
endorses the imposition of liability in the foregoing circumstances, it does not take this further step.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 8 ill. 10 & Reporter's
Note (Council Draft No. 1, 2006). It is true that in section 21, "Preventive Expenses," the Council
Draft supports recovery in circumstances where a claimant incurs or will incur expense to prevent
or mitigate a risk of serious bodily harm. But it does not abstract and generalize the underlying basis
of such liability and denies recovery for expenses incurred to prevent damage to property rights.
Under section 19, a claimant who incurs expense to alleviate or prevent physical harm to the person
or property of anotherarising from the defendant's negligence may recover such expense under the
law of restitution, not negligence. Moreover, such expenses are treated on a par with expenses
incurred to compensate for such harm. The latter, however, is not unavoidable economic loss.
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Christi Oil & Gas Co. v. Zapata Gulf Marine Corp.,136 which should now be
viewed as the leading unavoidable pure economic loss case.
In Corpus Christi Oil, the plaintiff owned offshore gas wells and a platform.
Attached to a leg of the platform was a riser, a vertical pipe through which
flowed gas and gas condensate. A third party owned the riser as well as the
connecting pipe, which was eight miles long and ran from the platform to the
beach. The defendant's barge allided with the plaintiff's platform, damaging the
third party's gas riser but not the plaintiff's platform or wells. The third party
ordered the plaintiff to shut in its own wells so that it could inspect the riser and
replace the damaged section. During the two-week period of repairs, the riser
remained unaffected in the ground but the plaintiff was no able to use the riser to
convey its gas. As a consequence, the plaintiff sustained financial losses from its
inability to produce and sell its gas during this period. In addition, the plaintiff
had to flare its gas in order to avert structural damage to its wells. The plaintiff
sued the defendant for the cost incurred
in flaring its gas as well as for revenues
37
lost during the repairs to the gas riser.'
The Court allowed recovery for the costs of flaring the gas. The costs of
flaring were "directly attributable to [the plaintiffs] efforts to avoid the physical
damages that would have rendered that defendant liable for much larger
sums. ' 38 Costs incurred "to save its wells" constituted "the physical damage to a
proprietary interest, i.e. its gas"' 39 sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
economic loss rule. By contrast, the court denied recovery for the lost profits. It
did so, not because the loss consisted in lost profit rather than costs, but only
because it was not consequential upon injury to the requisite protected interest.
According to the Court, the lost revenues resulted solely from the fact that the
plaintiff "could not use the [defendant's] pipeline."' 4° The loss was "occasioned
only by the physical injury to [the third party's] riser, property in which Corpus
Christi had no proprietary interest."' 41 Since the lost revenues resulted from the
unavailability of the riser and not from the flaring of the gas, the Court treated
the claims for lost profit as qualitatively distinct and legally independent from
the claim for the costs of flaring. The losses flowed from interferences with two
different interests, only one of which belonged to the plaintiff. The Court
expressly refused to interpret Robins as permitting recovery for economic loss
sustained by a plaintiff so long as the plaintiff suffers some iniury to person or
property, irrespective of the connection between the two losses.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

1 F.3d 198, 207 (5th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 200.
Id. at 202.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 203.
Id. at 204.
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The entire judgment rested upon a careful analysis of the "character of the

interest harmed."' 4 The claim for lost revenues presupposed that the plaintiff
had, as against the defendant, a protected interest in the continued use of the gas
riser. Since, however, the plaintiff's right in the continued use of the gas riser
was only against the third party, the claim for lost revenues must fail, not
because it was economic loss or lost profit, but because it was for damage to an
interest which was legally unprotected as between plaintiff and defendant. By
contrast, the plaintiff's action for the costs of flaring rested solely on its right to
have its property (gas wells) left alone. The fact that the plaintiff incurred these
costs to avoid or mitigate threateneddamage to its property, rather than suffering
actual damage with resulting financial loss, does not mean that the loss no longer
related to the plaintiff's exclusive right. 144 To hold otherwise would entail that
the plaintiff must allow the defendant to damage its property-a conclusion that

would have denied the plaintiffs right altogether. Understood in this light, the
Corpus Christicourt's decision is fully consistent with Robins.
2.

The Contrastwith Reliance

Pure economic loss resulting from a person's reasonable reliance on another
is actionable. The analysis of reliance-based liability is thus important for any
complete account of pure economic loss. A full explanation of the basis of such

liability, and in particular its relation to a more general conception of negligence,
is beyond the scope of this Article.145 Instead, I will briefly discuss a more
limited-but nonetheless essential-point. Courts regularly refer to reliance as
involving a "special relation" between the parties and hold, therefore, that the
economic loss rule does not automatically apply. 146 This has led commentators to

note the emergence of a broad dichotomy in the analysis of pure economic loss
between situations coming under the no recovery rule and those involving

143. Id. at 201. This phrase, which has been quoted over the years by numerous courts, is
taken from Dick Meyers Towing Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th Cir. 1978)
144. This reasoning brings American law into line with English and Commonwealth decisions
and casts doubt upon categorical statements by other, generally lower, United States courts that
economic loss arising from threatened rather than actual injury is never recoverable. See, e.g., In re
One Meridian Plaza Fire Litig., 820 F. Supp. 1460, 1484 (E.D. Pa. 1993). For English and
Commonwealth decisions in accord, see, for example, Weller & Co. v. Foot & Mouth Disease
Research Inst., (1966) 1 Q.B. 569 (Eng.) ("[I]n an action of negligence founded on failure to take
care to avoid damage to the property of another, only those whose property is injured, or at least
directly threatened with injury, can recover."), and Murphy v. Brentwood Dist. Council, (1991) 1
A.C. 398 (Eng. H.L.) ("[P]laintiff's expenditure is... incurred in... preventing the injury from
occurring."). In Canada, there is the important decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Winnipeg Condominium Corp v. Bird ConstructionCo., [1995] 1 S.C.R. 85 (Can.).
145. I discuss reliance-based recovery of economic loss in Benson, supra note 5, at 450-55
and in Benson, supra note 49, at 155-65.
146. See Barber Lines A/S v. MN Dona Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Hedley
Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.)).
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reliance.1 47 What makes situations of actionable reliance different from
nonrecoverable relational economic loss? I want to identify the chief conditions
of reliance-based liability and show how these differentiate the two situations.
The case law advances two interconnected requirements for actionable
reliance.148 First, the plaintiff must have actually relied on the defendant's
representation or undertaking in the sense of changing position to his or her
detriment. The claim will be for the loss sustained as a result of so relying.
Second, the defendant must have assumed responsibility for the consequences of
the plaintiff's reliance. I will briefly consider each of these requirements in turn.
There is little controversy that there must be reliance in the sense of change
in position by the plaintiff. 149 Reliance involves some act or omission by the
plaintiff that would not have occurred but for the decision to rely upon the
defendant. For example, revising the facts in Robins, suppose that the plaintiff
time-charterer, relying on the defendant dry-docking facility's promise to the
ship owner to service the vessel in a timely and effective fashion, enters into
contracts with third parties. The plaintiff's decision to contract with third parties
is its change of position in reliance on the defendant's promise. Suppose further
that the defendant is careless so that the vessel is unavailable to the plaintiff at
the expected time and that as a consequence the plaintiff becomes liable to these
third parties under their contracts, with resulting financial loss. The plaintiff is
now worse off than it would have been had it not so relied. It is this worsening of
the plaintiff's condition relative to its pre-reliance position that is the reliance
loss. 50 And it is for this loss that the plaintiff sues in negligence.
For the defendant to come under a duty of care, however, it is not sufficient
that the plaintiff relied in the manner just stated. The reliance was the plaintiff s
own voluntary decision. Something more is needed to make another party
responsible for the consequences of the plaintiff's decision to rely. That the

147. See Michael MacGrath, The Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Negligence-An
Emerging Dichotomy, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 350, 350-51 (1985). Exceptionally, there are
decisions that find a "special relation" between the parties even though there has not been reliance.
See J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979); Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal.
1958). For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Benson, supra note 49, at 155-65.
148. This is true of the main current approaches, as well as earlier leading decisions. For
examples of the most important recent decisions, see Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745,
758-59 (Cal. 1992); Stagen v. Stewart-West Coast Title Co., 196 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736-37 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 142 (N.J. 1983), superseded by statute,
1995 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 49 (West), as stated in, E. Dickerson & Son, Inc. v. Ernst & Young,
LLP, 846 A.2d 1237, 1240 (N.J. 2004); and Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 483
N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985). For the leading earlier decisions on this issue, see Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441,444-47 (N.Y. 1931), and Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 275-76 (N.Y.
1922). For the leading Commonwealth decision on this issue, see Hedley Byrne, [1964] A.C. 465
(Eng.). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: EcON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 9, at 52

(Council Draft No. 1, 2006) (adopting this approach).
149. For a classic discussion of this element, see Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous
Promisesor Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REV. 913, 926 (1951).
150. For a typical statement of this last point, see Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 152 n. 13. For the
clearest statement of this point, see Seavey, supra note 149, at 927.
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decision to rely may have been foreseeable is not enough. 151 For the defendant to
be held liable, the defendant must have done something, on the basis of which
the defendant may reasonably be held to have assumed this responsibility. More
specifically, the defendant's conduct (whether by word or deed and including
both acts and omissions) must be such that the plaintiff may reasonably view the
defendant as intending that the plaintiff rely or as inviting the plaintiff to do
so. 152 So in the Robins-based scenario described above, the plaintiff timecharterer must show reliance on a representation-implied or express-by the
defendant dry-docking facility to the plaintiff that the vessel would be ready at
the expected time: more specifically, the plaintiff must reasonably be able to
view the defendant as inviting the plaintiff to rely on its conduct, representation,
or assurance. 153 This makes the plaintiff s reliance upon the defendant justified
or reasonable; correlatively, the defendant may now be held to have assumed
responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of plaintiff's reliance and as such
to be under a duty to take reasonable
54 care in words and conduct, both in making
the representation and afterwards.
On the actual facts of Robins, the plaintiffs did not put forward any evidence
of reasonable reliance. They did not claim a loss that resulted from having relied
on the defendant and there were no facts showing that the plaintiffs could
reasonably have viewed the defendant as inviting them to rely. The plaintiffs'
loss arose through their contract with the vessel owner-a contract which the
parties had entered into before the defendant came on the scene.' 55 Robins was
not a reliance case.
Granted this conclusion, the question remains as to whether claims that do
meet the requirements of reliance are based on an exclusive right as against the
defendant. If they do not, recovery would be in tension with Robins even if
reliance scenarios differ from Robins in the manner just suggested. For instance,
in the revised Robins-based scenario where the defendant has reasonably invited
the plaintiffs to rely on an assurance of timely repair and in reliance thereon the
plaintiff enters into contracts with third parties, what is plaintiff's exclusive right
as against the defendant? The plaintiff s right cannot be in the performance itself
of the timely servicing of the vessel because this service is owed-

151. All the decisions cited supra note 148, except for Rosenblum, agree on this point.
152. Except for Rosenblum, which represents a minority view, the decisions cited supra note
148 require that the defendant intends or invites reliance as a condition of his or her coming under a
duty of care. For further scholarly discussion of the idea of invited reliance, see Benson, supra note
5, at 450-55; Mark P. Gergen, The Ambit of Negligence Liabilityfor Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ.
L. REv. 749, 750, 752-60 (2006); and Perry, ProtectedInterests, supra note 19, at 281-85.
153. As throughout negligence, an objective test would apply. See Bily v. Arthur Young &
Co., 834 P.2d 745, 769-70 (Cal. 1992); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922); Hedley
Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, 486 (H.L.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: ECON. TORTS AND RELATED WRONGS § 9 cmt. d(2), at 60 (Council Draft No. 1, 2006).
154. For discussion of the standard of care in reliance cases, see Seavey, supra note 149, at
927 & n. 57.
155. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1927).
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contractually-to the ship owner, not to the plaintiff. To succeed, the plaintiff
must be able to assert an interest of its own. As I will now explain, the
requirement of reliance itself plays a crucial role.
Recall that the plaintiff's reliance claim is for damages that will undo the
losses resulting from plaintiff's change of position; in other words, for damages
that will put the plaintiff back in the situation it was in before it did, or omitted to
do, anything in reliance upon the defendant. Thus plaintiffs pre-reliance
position is the baseline against which its loss is measured. If this is so, the
plaintiff's exclusive right against the defendant must be with respect to that
position. To illustrate, in the hypothetical, the plaintiff's pre-reliance situation is
that it would not have contracted with third parties or at least that it would have
taken alternative measures to protect itself against the risk of financial loss that it
now faces vis-a-vis the third parties. We suppose that the plaintiff can establish
that it could and would have availed itself of one of these alternatives had it not
relied on defendant's assurance, and that, in this way, it could and would have
avoided the loss that actually resulted from defendant's lack of care. For the
plaintiff, these alternatives therefore represent a no-loss situation in comparison
with its post-reliance situation and, as such, constitute a valuable asset which the
plaintiff could and would have had for itself but for its change of position at the
invitation of the defendant.
Now a valuable asset can, in principle, be the content of an exclusive rightfor instance the content of a personal right such as contract. In the circumstances
of invited reliance, what the plaintiff has against the defendant is in fact a
personal right with respect to the value of its pre-reliance situation. Given the
defendant's invitation to rely, fairness and reasonableness require the defendant
to treat the plaintiff's pre-reliance alternatives as a valuable asset belonging to
the plaintiff with respect to which the defendant must exercise due care, both in
making the assurance and in its subsequent conduct-within the parameters of
its invitation to rely. In other words, the defendant may not say that the prereliance situation of no loss is not a valuable asset or that this asset never
belonged to the plaintiff because the plaintiff did not avail itself of it. The
defendant's own conduct of inviting reliance estops the defendant from so
asserting. Exercising reasonable care requires at least of the defendant that it give
the plaintiff adequate time and opportunity to return to the pre-reliance situation
without loss. If this option is no longer available to the plaintiff, due care may
necessitate the defendant following through on its representation or its
equivalent.156 In this way, the pre-reliance position counts as a protected interest
as against the defendant-but only against the defendant-precisely because of
the defendant's invitation to rely.15 Thus understood, reliance-based liability

156. See Seavey, supra note 149, at pp. 925-27.
157. Accord Seale v. Perry, [1982] V.R. 193, 202 (Austl.) (Lush, L.J.) ("In the negligent
misrepresentation cases, it may perhaps be said that a right arises in the plaintiff out of the facts of
reliance by the plaintiff on the misrepresentation and an acceptance of responsibility by the
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satisfies Robins's requirement of an exclusive right. It is indeed the factor of
reasonable reliance that makes the difference.
IV. PuRE

ECONOMIC LOSS AND THE GENERAL CONCEPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

Thus far, I have explained the denial of relational economic loss claims, not

as a bright line rule nor even as resting upon a pragmatic concern about
indeterminate or extensive liability, but as stemming wholly from a purely

juridical consideration: the significance of the requirement of a possessory or
proprietary interest is that, in virtue of this, the plaintiff can assert a right,
exclusive as against the defendant, to having or using an item free from

interference by the defendant. In the absence of a contract or some other basis of
personal right against the defendant, the plaintiff cannot have an exclusive right
in any other way. 158This is a categoricalrequirement: whenever a plaintiff lacks
this right, the defendant is not under a duty of care toward the plaintiff and so its

carelessness cannot constitute a wrong against the plaintiff with respect to the
resulting economic loss. This is so however foreseeable or reasonably avoidable
the loss may be. Finally, whether a plaintiff has this right is determined by the
law of property and possession or in general by the principles and rules of law

that specify in rem rights. Thus, the determination essential to liability can be
made on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with recognized and settled legal
principles, and with the same certainty and ease of application as any private law

determination of rights." 9
To conclude this effort to develop a public basis of justification for relational

economic loss, this final Part addresses two main questions. Does Robins's

requirement of an exclusive right reflect a general prerequisite for negligence
liability that applies to both physical and economic loss? If so, what is the
relation between this prerequisite and foreseeability? My aim is to place Robins

within a wider framework of a general analysis of negligence. While this general
analysis should ideally be drawn from the case law if it is to qualify as part of a

defendant for the advice contained in the misrepresentation, a right which arises out of a relation of
'proximity', a para-contractual right.").
158. This same conclusion is reached in Seale v. Perry:
A duty ...cannot exist by itself. To the duty seen as imposed on the defendant, there
must be a correlative right in the plaintiff: for either to exit, both must be capable of being
identified.... I venture to think that it is really the problem of identifying the right which
the plaintiff is entitled to have protected which underlies the difficulties of allowing
actions to be brought in cases where the plaintiff has suffered and suffered only economic
loss ....I do not regard the emphasis on property damage or personal injury in decided
cases ... as either arbitrary or restrictive. I think a consideration of the right which must
be correlative to any suggested duty reveals the reason for emphasis.
Id. at 200-02.
159. Besides meeting an important desideratum of a public legal basis justification, this
feature of the proposed juridical, noneconomic approach to pure economic loss may, also be
desirable from an economic standpoint. See Henry Smith, Law and Economics: Realism or
Democracy, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 141-42 (2009).
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public basis of justification, it need not coincide with the conception of
negligence that happens to be currently prevailing in legal scholarship or even in
leading judicial formulations if these seem to be in tension with firm and definite
premises of the law. I shall argue that Robins does reflect a more general
principle of negligence and that this principle, in turn, suggests a conception of
negligence, and more particularly of duty, that differs fundamentally from the
one that is currently dominant among legal scholars.
A.

The Robins Principle Generalized

To begin with the first question, what was Holmes's own view of the
character and the scope of the reason for nonrecovery in Robins? The answer is
clear. As we have seen, Justice Holmes presented it as a requirement of justice,
framed in wholly general terms-the existence of a real or personal right with
respect to the damaged item as against the defendant; in other words, terms
inherently suited to apply to any claim in negligence or in fact, to claims in other
parts of private law as well. While Justice Holmes did not make this point
explicitly in Robins, he did so in his discussion of the "general principles of
liability" in The Common Law:

[T]here are certain forms of harm which.., can never be complained of
by any one except a person who stands in a particular relation to the
actor or to some other person or thing. Thus it is neither a harm nor a
wrong to take fish from a pond unless the pond is possessed or owned

by some one, and then only to the possessor or owner. It is neither a
harm nor a wrong to abstain from delivering a bale of wool at a certain
time and place, unless a binding promise has6 been made so to deliver it,
and then it is a wrong only to the promisee.' 0
In this passage and following, Justice Holmes supposes that conduct,
whether an act or an omission, is not a wrong at law unless it is a wrong against
someone; that to be a wrong against someone, the conduct must impair or
otherwise affect something under that person's right, whether by virtue of
possession, property, or contract; and finally, to be recoverable, the loss must be
sustained by the one who has such a right and must result from the interference
with that right. This analysis holds for any kind of recoverable loss and makes no
distinction between physical and economic damage. Notice also that the question
of whether the parties are related in the requisite way is conceptually distinct and
prior to the question of whether the defendant has exercised due care. The

160. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 131 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)
(1881) (emphasis added).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss4/3

44

2009]

Benson:
The Problem
Pure
EconomicLoss
Loss
THE PROBLEM
WITHwith
PURE
ECONOMIC

priority of duty is implicitly supposed by Holmes's understanding.161 Moreover,
Justice Holmes assumes that, in addition to bodily integrity, there are only three

elementary and general grounds of individual rights at common law which give
persons standing to complain a6ainst others that they have done harms:
possession, property, and contract. Thus, Justice Holmes does not present tort

law, including negligence, as an additional original source of right, but, to the
contrary, supposes that for the plaintiff to maintain a tort action, the plaintiff
must already have the needed right on one of these other bases, including the
right of bodily integrity. 163 Finally, he presents these rights as exclusionary: each

consists in a right to exclude others from possessing, using, or disposing of what
comes under one's right. 164 Whereas the rights of ownership and possession,
being in rem, exclude indefinite others, contract rights are in personanexcluding only the definite person or persons who are parties to the contract.
Does modern tort law generally recognize this kind of protected interest as a

prerequisite of liability, in addition to the foreseeability requirement? To show
that it does, we should look for settled and representative instances of loss
which, however foreseeable, are not actionable precisely because they do not

arise from an injury to rights in the required way.
A natural place to begin is the settled point that one is not liable to

competitors for causing them even foreseeable economic loss by drawing away
business from them, even knowingly, so long as one has not done this by
procuring or inducing breach of contract.165 A duty to avoid causing economic
loss must be framed so as not entail the possibility of such liability, with the
consequence that there cannot be a general duty to avoid causing even

foreseeable pure economic loss but, at most, a duty that arises only in certain
circumstances and not in others. 166 Accordingly, if the law is to be consistent
throughout, a duty to avoid causing pure economic loss cannot arise in
circumstances that bring into play the very considerations that underlie the

161. There seems to be an internal tension (usually unnoticed) in Holmes's work, including in
his judgments, between this view and the more dominant, purely policy-based conception of
negligence.
162. See HOLMES, supra note 160, at 131.
163. Accord Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its Utilitarian
Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 52 (1979) ("Tort law presupposes some prior, independent
method for defining and recognizing property rights both in the person and in external objects."):
164. HOLMES, supra notel60, at 174, 193.
165. For a general summary of the law, see FLEMING, supra note 4, at 161-68, and KEETON
ET AL., supra note 2, § 129 at 978-1013. For particularly clear American judicial discussions stating
this principle, see Citizens' Light & Heat Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171
F. 553, 558-62 (M.D. Ala. 1909); Beekman v. Marsters, 80 N.E. 817, 818-20 (Mass. 1907); May v.
Wood, 51 N.E. 191, 192-93 (Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J., dissenting); and Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass.
555, 562-65 (1871). For the most important English decisions, see Quinn v. Leathern, [1901] A.C.
495 (U.K.); Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1 (H.L. 1897) (Eng.); Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor,
Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25 (Eng.); and Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.).
166. See Perry, Protected Interests, supra note 19, at 263-65 (underlining and developing this
point).
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refusal to impose liability for competition losses. What might those
considerations be?
One explanation is that economic competition contributes to the general
welfare, and that such loss is the unavoidable concomitant of this welfareenhancing activity. 167 Without denying this, a quite different, rights-based
explanation is available: the defendant may permissibly cause the plaintiff even
foreseeable competition losses because, in doing this, the defendant does not
168
affect any of the plaintiffs rights that are exclusive as against the defendant.
How so?
Clearly, one does not have a possessory or property right in the continued
custom or business of others. At most, plaintiffs may have a potential or actual
contractual relation with third parties. If there is no contract, there is no right that
can be injured. The fact that plaintiffs may wish, or even happen, to benefit from
the business of others and may plan on this basis does not establish a right to this
benefit as against defendants. And even if a plaintiff does conclude a contract
with a third-party customer, the contractual rights and obligations run between
the plaintiff and the third party, not between the plaintiff and the defendant. The
fact that third parties may choose to breach their agreements with the plaintiff by
giving the defendant their business does not, without more, make the defendant
liable. This is the third party's decision. If all that the defendant has done is just
to deal with the general public in an ordinary business manner, the fact that the
defendant attracts third parties cannot be a wrong to the plaintiff. It is true that by
doing business, the defendant provides the occasion for this decision to breach.
But the defendant cannot avoid attracting these third parties without ceasing to
do business.1 69 Thus it is an inevitable consequence of the very activity in which
are engaged. 17 The plaintiff cannot have a
both the plaintiff and the defendant
right against the defendant in this regard because any such right would be self-

167. For a general discussion of this point, see HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF
POLITICS 60 (2d ed. 1897). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REv. 457, 466 (1897) ("Why is a man at liberty to set up a business which he knows will ruin his
neighborhood? It is because the public good is supposed to be best subserved by free competition.
Obviously such judgments of relative importance may vary in different times and places.").
168. All the decisions, both American and English, cited supra note 165, analyze this question
in terms of the rights and correlative duties between the relevant parties. Particularly instructive
discussions are found in Beekman, 80 N.E. at 818-19, Walker, 107 Mass. at 564, and the whole
judgment of Bowen, L.J. in Mogul Steamship, [1892] A.C. at 25.
169. See, e.g., Beekman, 80 N.E. at 819-20 ("[A] plaintiff does not go far enough to render a
defendant liable for unlawful interference with his contractual rights, when he proves that the
defendant, in using the ordinary methods of promoting and increasing his own business, obtained
business from the other party to the plaintiffs contract which that other party could not have given
him without breaking his contract with the plaintiff, and that this was known to the defendant.").
170. See, e.g., Citizens' Light, 171 F. at 560-61 ("The trader who has made a contract with

another person has a right, which the law will protect, to have that other keep it. Other traders have
the correlative right to solicit the custom to which the contract relates. Whatever damage results to
the first trader by the mere solicitation is privileged, so far as the solicitor is concerned, in the
interest of proper freedom of competition.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol60/iss4/3

46

20091

Benson: The Problem with Pure Economic Loss
THE PROBLEM WITH PURE ECONOMIC Loss

defeating. If this is all that the defendant's drawing away of actual or prospective
customers entails, then it must be damnum sine injuria.
Of course, the defendant can be held liable for drawing customers away
from the plaintiff by inducing or procuring their breach of contract. But this
intentional tort requires something more than the defendant providing an
occasion for third party breaches through its general and ordinary business
dealings with the public. The defendant must do something that is directed
toward the specific contractual relation between the plaintiff and the third party
for the purpose of appropriating, injuring, or otherwise interfering with the
relation itself. 17 1 While ordinarily contractual rights exist only between the
parties to the contract, in these circumstances where a defendant has so acted the
law treats the plaintiff's contractual interest as a protected right not just against
the other contracting party but also against the defendant-as a "quasi-property"
right between them. 172 This is essential to courts finding that the defendant has
injured a protected interest in the plaintiff, so that the defendant can be held
liable for the resulting economic losses-in contrast to the exclusion of liability
for competition losses. 173 The conclusion that contractual rights can be protected
assets in such involuntary transactions mirrors the settled point that contractual
rights may often be assigned by voluntary transactions to third parties no
differently than rights in rem.74
This rights-based rationale for the nonrecovery of pure competition losses
exactly parallels the legal treatment of relational economic loss. In both cases,
the defendant has interfered with an asset, but not in any respect that is exclusive
against the defendant as a matter of rights. Relational economic losses arise from
the plaintiff not being able to use a damaged asset that the plaintiff neither owns
nor possesses; since the asset does not belong to the plaintiff "against the world,"
the plaintiff cannot hold it exclusive as against the defendant. Similarly,
competition losses result from the defendant affecting an interest in the plaintiff
which the latter has, at most, in relation to third parties, 175
not with respect to what
the plaintiff can assert to the exclusion of the defendant.

171. This specifies the "malice" requirement in the intentional tort of interference with
contractual relations. The most thorough and instructive discussion of this tort is still Francis Bowes
Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REv. 663, 678-86 (1923).
172. For judicial discussions of this point, see Raymond v. Yarrington, 73 S.W. 800, 803
(Tex. 1903), and, more recently, OBG Ltd. v. Allan, (2008) 1 A.C. 1, 32 (H.L.) (Lord Hoffman). For
scholarly discussion, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, § 129, at 981, and Sayre, supra note 171, at
675-76.
173. It also meets the objections against the tort of intentional interference in Justice
Coleridge's powerful and scholarly dissent in Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B.), as
well as doubts raised by certain scholars against this decision. See JOHN AUSTIN, 1 JURISPRUDENCE
402 (4th ed. 1879); FREDERICK POLLOCK, TORTS 328 (8th ed.).
174. For further development of this analysis, see Benson, supra note 5, at 455-57.
175. Mention should be made here of another important decision that illustrates this same
pattern of analysis. In Tate & Lyle Indus. Ltd v. GreaterLondon Council, (1983) 2 A.C. 509 (H.L.)
(Eng.), plaintiffs, sugar refiners, were prevented from transporting their raw sugar to their refinery
on vessels because the channel was insufficiently deep due to siltation of the bed caused by the

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

47

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 60:823

This analysis pervades the law of torts. Indeed, it can be stated in terms of a
familiar principle: there is no liability for nonfeasance but only for misfeasance.
Professor Francis Bohlen wrote famously of the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction that none is "more deeply rooted in the common law and more
fundamental." ' 176 While the interpretation of the misfeasance/nonfeasance

distinction is not free from ambiguity or controversy, I suggest, in agreement
with Bohlen and in light of what courts actually do, 77that the distinction is best

understood, not as a purely factual difference between act and omission, but as a
normative idea that marks the limits of a conception of wrong that is utterly basic
to the law of torts. 178
Misfeasance is conduct of any kind (act or omission) by
one that can interfere with or otherwise affect something that comes under
another's right (in their person, property, and so forth) insofar as this right is
exclusive against the first. Nonfeasance is simply conduct that falls short of this.

defendants, requiring the plaintiffs to take costly measures to dredge the channel bed. The lower
courts held that the defendants should have realized that their activity might cause substantial
siltation and that this was reasonably avoidable. The plaintiffs' losses were foreseeable. In deciding
whether the plaintiffs could recover their losses in negligence at the House of Lords, Lord
Templeman wrote:
[The plaintiffs' claim] ... assumes that [they] possess the right to use their jetties in the sense
that they are entitled to the maintenance of a depth of water ...sufficient to enable
vessels ... to load and unload at the jetties. The question is whether [plaintiffs] possess any
right to any particular depth of water. If they have any such right then they will have a remedy
for interference with that fight. But if they have no such right then interference with the depth
of water causing damage to [their] business constitutes an injury for which [plaintiffs] have no
remedy.
Id. at 530-31. After canvassing various possible grounds of such a right-the law of riparian rights,
contract, public nuisance, and so forth-Lord Templeman concluded that the plaintiffs did not have
any such right and therefore should be denied recovery. Id. at 544.
176. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA.
L. REV. 217, 219 (1908).
177. One of the most helpful judicial statements is Lord Diplock's in the landmark English
House of Lords case, Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1060 (H.L.). Given the
opinion's influence and clarity, it is useful to quote it in full:
The branch of English law which deals with civil wrongs abounds with instances of
acts and, more particularly, of omissions which give rise to no legal liability in the doer
or omitter for loss or damage sustained by others as a consequence of the act or omission,
however reasonably or probably that loss or damage might have been
anticipated.... Examples could be multiplied. You may cause loss to a tradesman by
withdrawing your custom though the goods which he supplies are entirely satisfactory;
you may damage your neighbour's land by intercepting the flow of percolating water to it
even though the interception is of no advantage to yourself; you need not warn him of a
risk of physical danger to which he is about to expose himself unless there is some
special relationship between the two of you such as that of occupier of land and visitor;
you may watch your neighbour's goods being ruined by a thunderstorm though the
slightest effort on your part could protect them from the rain and you may do so with
impunity unless there is some special relationship between you such as that of bailor and
bailee.
Id.
178. I develop and elaborate this view in Peter Benson, Misfeasance As an Organizing
Normative Idea in Private Law (2009, on file with author).
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Thus, there are examples of positive conduct (acts) 179 that are nonfeasance
because they cannot possibly affect such rights; conversely, there are instances

of inaction' which are misfeasance because they can do so. Moreover, the
misfeasance principle is a general requirement that applies to both physical and
financial loss.'81 To illustrate and elucidate this understanding of the principle, I
will briefly discuss the standard failure to rescue scenario where the defendant
does not rescue the plaintiff from a danger to which the defendant has not

contributed in any way.182 This is widely viewed as the paradigmatic instance of
nonfeasance.
In the rescue scenario, the defendant can avert danger to the plaintiffs
person or property by taking certain-perhaps even costless-measures. But the
defendant does not, and the plaintiff suffers resulting injury. This loss is

presumably a perfectly foreseeable outcome of the defendant's omission, and
cause-in-fact is satisfied because a rescue would have prevented the plaintiff's
loss. 183 Finally, it is assumed that there is no special relation between the parties,
whereby the endangered plaintiff is entitled to rely on the defendant for

assistance. It is settled common law that an action in negligence for this loss
must fail. 84 The generally accepted reason for denying liability is that the
defendant does not owe a duty to the plaintiff to rescue him or her from the

danger.
One rationale for the absence of a duty is that the failure to rescue is a pure
omission, and in negligence, pure omissions cannot be the basis of liability. The

gist of the plaintiffs complaint is that the defendant has done nothing. On this

179. In addition to the competition loss cases discussed earlier, further examples include
interference with the flow of percolating water in English law, see Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles,
[1985] A.C. 587 (H.L.), or interference with the flow of light in American nuisance law, see
Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1959). In Fontainebleau, the court rejected the plaintiff's claim explicitly on the basis that the
plaintiff lacked the requisite right in the interest (namely, the free flow of light across the
defendant's adjoining land) with which the defendant's building activity had interfered. Id. at 35960. The question of the plaintiff's right was decided on the basis of general principles of property
law and contract. Id. at 359. The court stated that it would not, via the law of nuisance, confer upon
the plaintiff "'incorporeal rights incidental to his ownership of land which the law does not
sanction."' Id. at 360 (quoting Musumeci v. Leonardo, 75 A.2d 175, 177 (R.I. 1950)).
180. One well known example is Goldman v. Hargrave, [1967] 1 A.C. 645, in which a
landowner failed to put out a fire which was started when lightning struck a tree on his land, causing
the fire to spread to his neighbor's land. Another example is the failure to take action where another
is reasonably relying, to that person's detriment, on one's doing so. See cases cited supra note 148.
181. See Home Office, [1970] A.C. at 1060.
182. The following brief discussion draws on my analysis of failure to rescue in Benson, supra
note 178.
183. For a helpful discussion of omissions and causation, see Richard W. Wright, Acts and
Omissions as Positive and Negative Causes, in EMERGING ISSUES IN TORT LAW 287, 290-92
(Neyers et al. eds., 2007).
184. See Home Office, [1970] A.C. at 1060; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314 (1965) ("The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary
for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.").
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view, the defendant owes no duty because he did not act at all. If there is a
complete absence of conduct of any kind, it is a legal truism that, absent a
special relationship between the parties, there should not be liability. One cannot
wrong another simply by being, in contrast to doing something. In this way, the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is equated with the difference
between acts and omissions.
As an explanation of the failure to rescue cases, however, this analysis is not
entirely satisfactory. In the circumstances described above, it is not self-evident
that the defendant simply has done nothing. To the contrary, the defendant
decides to use his or her capacities, external resources, and so on, not to assist
the plaintiff, but for something else. This is, after all, a decision and a choice
which the defendant has made. Courts are not mistaken when, in these and in
related circumstances, they refer to acts of both commission and omission.' 85 If,
still, there is no liability, it must be, not because of a complete absence of any
conduct, but in virtue of the lack of a certain kind of conduct which alone is
morally relevant for the purposes of liability. 186 As I will now explain, the
defendant did not do anything to affect the plaintiff s exclusionary rights.
Since it is the plaintiffs life or property that is in danger, the only legally
recognized interests which the plaintiff can assert vis-a-vis the defendant are the
plaintiffs rights of bodily integrity and property. But these interests are
protected through rights to exclude the defendant. At least, this is how they
function and are standardly interpreted within private law. Now, supposing, as
we have, that the defendant has not in any way contributed to the danger, what
the plaintiff can assert to the exclusion of the defendant is just his or her bodily
existence or property in this condition of danger. This is what belongs to the
plaintiff as his or her protected interest relative to the defendant. And it is this
"asset" which the defendant must not injure or otherwise affect without the
plaintiff's consent. But this is precisely what the defendant's decision not to
rescue does: it simply leaves the plaintiffs condition untouched-as is. Holding
the defendant liable would therefore compel the gratuitous conferral upon the
plaintiff of a benefit over and above what belongs to him or her exclusively as
against the defendant. The parties' merely exclusionary rights cannot require this
of the defendant. Even though it may be true that the defendant's failure to
rescue represents a possible choice and decision and so a course of conduct, it is

185. The English court referred to acts of commission and omission in Southcote v. Stanley,
156 Eng. Rep. 1195, 1197 (Ex.1856).
186. In relation to other kinds of values and considerations, the non-rescuer's decision may
very well be morally relevant and a basis for ascribing blame. In the recent House of Lords decision
in Stovin v. Wise, Lord Hoffman formulates the misfeasance/nonfeasance contrast as that between
"regulating the way in which an activity may be conducted and imposing a duty to act upon a
person who is not carrying on any relevant activity." [19961 A.C. 923, 953-55 (H.L.) (emphasis
added). The key question is: What is relevant activity for the purposes of this distinction? This
Article suggests an answer.
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not conduct that can possibly affect whatever rights the plaintiff has as against
the defendant.
Even though the defendant's failure to rescue may represent a decision, and

so a course of conduct, it is not conduct that can affect rights the plaintiff has to
the exclusion of the defendant. As such, the defendant's conduct is nonfeasance

because it is not the sort of doing that can possibly be a wrong or an injury.
Moreover, although in a purely factual sense, the plaintiff may be worse off than

if the defendant performed the rescue, the plaintiff has not, in legal
contemplation, lost anything. Loss and benefit are legal conceptions, not merely
factual ones. It is in this sense that we should understand the frequently stated

formulation of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction in terms
of a contrast
87
between causing injury and simply failing to confer a benefit.
Far from reflecting a merely factual difference between acts and omissions,
then, the distinction between misfeasance

and nonfeasance

expresses a

fundamental normative idea that in a person's interactions with others, the law
does not require one to benefit others, but only not to injure them. In contrast to
morals-where positive duties of aid and beneficence can be enjoined-the
idiom of tort law is restricted to merely negative prohibitions against injury. 88
The

protected

interests

of

others

must

be

left

alone.

The

misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction thus specifies a definite and limited version
of the harm principle that restricts protected interests to those that come under
one's exclusive rights against others. Interference with others' interests in a
wider sense which may certainly affect their well-being or happiness is not
grounds for liability. The fact that the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is a
normative idea does not mean, however, that its moral acceptability is selfevident or beyond controversy. Quite the contrary, it is a difficult issue that
requires careful and full consideration.
But to address that here is beyond the
89
scope of the present Article.'

187. See, e.g., H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928)
("What we need to know is the conduct that engenders the relation. It is here that the formula [the
time honored distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance], however incomplete, has its value
and significance. If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that in action would commonly result,
not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there
exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward."). Prosser and Keeton cite this passage
with approval. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 375 n. 20. For Bohlen, this difference between
causing loss and failing to benefit "lies at the root of the marked difference in liability at common
law for the consequences of misfeasance and non-feasance." Bohlen, supra note 176, at 221.
188. Certainly one of the most influential expressions of this fundamental normative idea is
Lord Atkin's in Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580 (H.L.) ("The rule that you are to love
your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question,
Who is my neighbour? Receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or
omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.") (emphasis
added). It is the substitution of an injunction against injury for the rule of love that signals the
presence of misfeasance.
189. I discuss this question in Benson, supra note 178.
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Robins, we now see, is a case of nonfeasance. It displays the same pattern of
analysis that explains the failure to rescue case. A single principle applies,
whether the conduct involves acts (in Robins) or omissions (in failure to rescue),
and whether the loss is financial (Robins) or physical (failure to rescue).
Understood in this way, the denial of recovery for relational economic9 loss is not
merely consonant with, but indeed required by, the logic of tort law.1 0
B.

The Basis of Duty and its Priority

According to the dominant scholarly model of negligence,' 9 1 a general
requirement exists to avoid foreseeable and unreasonable risks of harm to others,
with harm understood broadly as anything that negatively affects others' wellbeing. Since everyone is presumed to be subject to this requirement, the question
of duty is reducible to whether, in given circumstances, one's conduct entails
such foreseeable consequences. This approach views no-duty situations, in
which there is nevertheless foreseeable risk of harm, as exceptions to general
principles that must be rationalized on some other basis. The pragmatic
explanation of relational economic loss, which treats non-recovery as such an
exception, reflects, and is just a particular instance of, this dominant model.
But these no-duty situations, including relational economic loss, cannot be
so readily contained or explained away. They embody a basic premise of
negligence that is general and peremptory. The failure to rescue cases and Robins
do not merely deny that the imposition of unreasonable-but foreseeable-risk
of loss is a sufficient basis of duty.192 These cases go further and stipulate a
genuinely distinct and prior positive requirement: the loss must result from the
defendant's interference with something that comes under plaintiffs exclusive
rights as against the defendant. Whether there is a duty depends on whether this
positive requirement is met. Because interaction can affect the interests and wellbeing of others, without necessarily implicating their rights to exclude, the
question of duty must be genuinely distinct and irreducible.' 93 For the same
reason, the idea of reasonable care takes shape-and has legal meaning-only
within a framework of interaction that satisfies this positive requirement. In

190. Contra James, supra note 4, at 44 (reasons for nonrecovery of pure economic loss "do
not derive from the.., logic of tort law").
191. For the characteristics of the dominant model, I have drawn on the detailed and
instructive discussion in Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1762-77, 1812-25.
192. This is also true of the reliance cases, as discussed earlier. See supra Part lII.C.2.
193. Goldberg and Zipursky do not distinguish interests in this way. Without this distinction,
however, they are compelled to explain Robins on the basis that pure economic "harms" should not
in general be actionable because this would be too burdensome. Id. at 1833. On the other hand, they
argue that contrary to the law, there should be in principle a duty of rescue in emergency situations
given the importance of the interests at stake and the exceptional nature of the situation. Id. at 183637. It is not clear that the idea of duty, at least one that is rights based and not policy driven, is
performing any work in these analyses. The problem stems, I think, from their assumption of the
homogeneity of legally relevant interests.
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itself, reasonable care is inherently indeterminate as to whom and what it applies.
By carving out the kind of interests that are legally relevant, misfeasance
specifies these aspects and provides reasonable care with a form of determinacy
appropriate for the purposes of negligence. Given the requirement of
misfeasance, duty must be not only distinct and irreducible but also lexically
first' 94 in the analysis of negligence: the other elements of negligence are
specified and applied within a framework that satisfies this prerequisite of duty.
Against the current of the prevailing assumptions, Robins, and more
generally the misfeasance principle, suggest the conceptual autonomy and the
priority of duty as setting the basic legal relation within which the standard of
care is applied and given legally relevant meaning. However, we have also seen
that under this analysis the requisite exclusive interest alone is not a sufficient
basis of duty-foreseeability is also necessary. As I will now explain, the
requirements of an exclusive right and foreseeability are strikingly cohesive and
integrated. Together, they specify a distinct form of what may be called a
"relational analysis"'95of negligence.
That an exclusionary right has this relational character seems clear. Indeed,
this is the right's very essence. The interest is protected only if it can be
attributed to the plaintiff in his or her own right. It must belong to the plaintiff,
not someone else. What is more, the plaintiffs interest, as his or her own, must
simultaneously be as against the defendant. Absent this intrinsically relational
character, the plaintiffs interest is not protected. By requiring that conduct affect
an exclusionary right of bodily integrity, property, or possession, 196 negligence

law necessitates a form of protected interest that is intrinsically relational and, as
it were, privy between the parties.
Similarly, the foreseeability requirement has this relational character. In
general moral terms, for consequences to be the outcome of choice and therefore
imputable to the conduct of agents, the consequences must be avoidable and
hence foreseeable. However, the modern law of negligence specifies a definite,
strictly limited notion of foreseeability. For a plaintiff whose person or property
the defendant has injured to have standing to sue for the loss, demonstrating that
the defendant's careless conduct foreseeably threatened just anybody's protected
interests or the interests of "society in general" is insufficient, indeed irrelevant.
The conduct must be foreseeably dangerous relative to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
must show that, as against him or her and not just someone else, the defendant's
conduct threatened harm. Risk that is not relational in this way is irrelevant to

194. I use this in Rawls's sense of the term. See RAWLS, RESTATEMENT, supra note 13, at 4647.
195. This term is used by a number of contemporary tort theorists, in particular Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 6, at 1820.
196. Whether there are or can be other, generally recognized bases of exclusive rights in
private law, I leave open in this Article.
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the law of negligence. 197 There is no such thing as risk in the air, just as there is
no negligence in the air.'98 Thus, the foreseeability requirement specifies a form
of foreseeability that is also privy as between the parties. Only conduct that
threatens injury to the plaintiff in this way can possibly wrong the plaintiff.
From a normative point of view, no one would deny that culpability for
negligence must entail conduct that impacts upon the interests of others. We now
see that the law of negligence, through its requirements of an exclusive right and
of foreseeability, specifies this general idea of interaction in terms of a direct and
immediate relation between two parties. Exclusive interest, foreseeability, and
wrong are all terms of relation: each must be suitably personal as between the
plaintiff and the defendant.199 At the same time, it should be emphasized that
their shared relational character is of a distinct kind, one that is rooted in and
wholly reflective of the misfeasance requirement with its severely restricted
notion of protected interest and all that this entails. There are many different
2 °°
categories of relations (often involving corresponding rights and duties)
between individuals in modem society. Each relation presumably has its own
qualitatively distinct character. Characterizing negligence simply as relational, or
even as having the general form of correlativity, is insufficient.20 1 The particular
form of relation (and correlativity) specifically implied by the misfeasance

requirement must be identified and elucidated.
Not only do the requirements of exclusive right and foreseeability share the
same character, but, in addition, they are ordered and integrated in a particular
way as prerequisites of duty in the analysis of negligence. Thus, as I have
already suggested, the requirement of an exclusive right must be conceptually
prior to the requirement of foreseeability. Viewed by itself, foreseeability, even
if understood in terms of a relation between plaintiff and defendant, is
indeterminate as to its object. The requirement of an exclusive right specifies it:
what must be foreseeable is just interference with something that belongs to the
plaintiff, such as his or her person and property, insofar as the defendant is

197. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). The majority
judgment in Palsgraf,in my view, thus turns on the appropriate conception of foreseeability, that is,
one that is relational as between the parties. This, in and of itself, specifies an essential condition of
the plaintiff's right to sue, and so long as other doctrinal requirements are met (for example,
requisite protected interest, cause in fact, proximate cause, and so forth), the plaintiff's right of
action is complete. I do not think that, apart from these prerequisites, the decision suggests or needs
a further, distinct substantive standing requirement, as Ben Zipursky argues in his interesting
discussion of the decision. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of
Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-17 (1998). I agree, however, with Zipursky that the basis of the
Cardozo judgment is this relational conception of negligence, id. at 8-10, not a "liability-limiting
policy rationale," id. at 15, that reflects a "fear of liability," id. at 14.
198. See Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 99.
199. Id. at 100 ("The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the
vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another.").
200. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 239 (1971).
201. This is one of the very few points of disagreement which I have with the GoldbergZipursky relational conception of duty. See supra note 193.
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excludable from it. 202 Reasonable foreseeability in negligence presupposes the
framework of misfeasance, within which alone it has its legally relevant meaning
and role.
At the same time, this framework is incomplete without the foreseeability
requirement. Without this requirement, a defendant would be under a duty not to
do anything-however unforeseeable-that in fact affects the plaintiff's person
or property. It is not just that this would fail to recognize a defendant's capacity
to plan and to choose. It would fail to recognize the defendant's own equal status
as a rights-holder to exercise control over his or her own body and property. To
be under an obligation not to use his or her own body or property in any way
that, however unforeseeably, affects others would empty of any content one's
equal rightful capacity to use one's things. It would entail the subordination of
the defendant to the plaintiff inasmuch as the plaintiff would be asserting the
very right of exclusive control over one's body and things denied the defendant.
To respect the parties' equal status as rights-holders, the relation established by
the requirement of an exclusive right must be completed by the foreseeability
doctrine. Together, the two requirements of exclusive right and foreseeability
specify the parameters of the plaintiff's protected interest and, correlatively, the
content and scope of a defendant's duty in a way that respects their equality.
They establish the fundamental legal relation that characterizes negligence.
This model of negligence, organized around a robust notion of duty that
incorporates both elements of exclusive right and foreseeability, stands in stark
contrast with the currently dominant model among tort scholars that takes the
standard of care to be the central organizing idea in negligence and assigns to
duty, which it roots in foreseeability alone, an ancillary and subordinate role.
Whereas this dominant view must treat relational economic loss cases as
exceptions to general principles of negligence, the alternative model I have
proposed explains how the nonrecovery of relational economic loss is perfectly
consonant with these principles. Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail Road Co. and
Robins can stand together as variations on a single theme. Both decisions
presuppose that negligence requires duty, and that duty requires both exclusive
right and foreseeabilty. In Palsgraf,the existence of an exclusive right in the
plaintiff (here, the right of bodily integrity) was not at issue; the only question
was whether there had been reasonably foreseeable impact on the plaintiffs
interest. But Justice Cardozo insisted that foreseeability be ascertained solely
with respect to the plaintiff's interest, not another's. In Robins-as in the other
nonfeasance cases-the issue is the existence of this interest. And Justice
Holmes insisted that the plaintiff must have an interest strictly relative as against
the defendant. In both cases, the plaintiffs failed because they could not establish
a claim that was freestanding with respect to the requirements of duty, but

202. Thus, in specifying the sort of foreseeability that is essential to duty, Cardozo explicitly
refers to the plaintiff's protected interests: "[N]egligence is not actionable unless it involves the
invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right." Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 99.
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instead attempted to piggyback on their fulfillment through the defendant's
relation to a third party. Pace James, Robins and Palsgrafreflect the very same
logic and theory of negligence.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is virtually a dogma among tort scholars that the nonrecovery of pure
economic loss in a variety of situations may be justified, if at all, only as a
special, policy-driven rule-the so-called "economic loss rule"-which limits
the usual operation of ordinary negligence principles, in particular foreseeability.
This view rests in turn on a more general conception of negligence in which
foreseeability is a sufficient condition of duty, and duty is merely ancillary to
reasonable care. The dominant approach to economic loss embodies both a
particular explanation of nonrecovery and this more general understanding of
negligence.
My aim has been to challenge these views-both the particular explanation
of economic loss and the general conception of negligence-through the
systematic reconsideration of the rationale denying relational economic loss
claims-the longest standing and most influential category of nonrecoverable
pure economic loss. The prevailing policy-driven explanation of economic loss
not only fails to account for core aspects of this part of negligence law, but
necessarily obscures the character of and the basis for nonrecovery as set out in
the economic loss decisions, above all in Robins-the leading decision regarding
economic loss. The teaching of Robins is that, far from representing an
exceptional and special policy-driven rule, the denial of relational economic loss
claims rests on an entirely different basis: one that has nothing to do with
foreseeability or with limitations on foreseeability, nor with any supposed
peculiar feature of economic loss as a distinct kind of harm; but rather for a
reason that is not only consonant with but in fact required by general and
ordinary principles of negligence applicable to all losses. This alternative
rationale provides a principled and readily practicable basis on which courts can
decide the issue of liability for the whole range of relational economic loss
scenarios without the need to engage in highly speculative and complex factual
and policy determinations. It elucidates the necessary distinctions between
nonrecoverable relational economic loss and the main instances where financial
loss is recoverable, without vulnerability to the usual objections against the
prevailing explanation. Finally, this rationale shows why alternative treatments
of relational economic loss proposed by minority courts and certain
foreign.common law courts cannot meet Robins's objection to recovery.
Beyond making sense of this longstanding yet highly contentious area of tort
law, the proposed approach has important implications for the way general
principles of negligence are to be understood. The reason for nonrecovery
reflects a more general requirement that is fundamental to and pervasive in tort
law. It illustrates the familiar, but sometimes mischaracterized, formula that
there is no liability for nonfeasance, only for misfeasance, of which Professor
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Francis Bohlen wrote that there is no distinction "more deeply rooted in the
common law and more fundamental. ,,203 An important task of this Article has
been to show that claims for relational economic loss are not actionable because,
on analysis, they are nonfeasance and that the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction is, as Bohlen suggested, a basic premise of tort liability in general
Understood in these terms, the relational economic loss cases are clearly
consonant with-and indeed required by-general negligence principles. At the
same time, the proposed approach brings into question the current model, in
which foreseeability is a sufficient condition of duty, and duty is merely
ancillary to reasonable care. The economic loss cases demonstrate that, far from
being a sufficient basis of duty, foreseeability only applies to legal relations that
satisfy the misfeasance principle. Together, the requirements of misfeasance and
foreseeability establish the fundamental relation of duty under negligence law.
Duty is not only an autonomous element, but is also lexically first in the analysis
of negligence. And it is only within this framework that the standard of care has
its meaning and relevance.

203. Bohlen, supra note 176, at 219-20.
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